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Nunberg examines current civil service manage-  agency system as their institutional capabilities
ment (CSM) practices in advanced countries to  increase.
provide guidance for developing country govern-
ments that face the dilemma of how to recruit,  o  Developing countries face trade-offs in
retain, and motivate appropriately skilled staff at  choosing which CSM functions should be
affordable costs, given a limited human resource  strengthened first. Two functions - personnel
base.  establishment control and staff recruitment -
are essential for civil service performance and
Advanced country administrations are  should get top priority.
following two distinct paths to improving CSM.
Some countries, such as the United Kingdom,  Senior Executive Services have proved
are engaged in sweeping "managerialist" reforms  difficult to design and implement in advanced
to decentralize civil service functions and make  countries, but many flaws can be corrected in
them more responsive to the client public. By  adapting them to developing countries, where
introducing complex financial reporting systems,  there is often an urgent need to groom higher-
managers have increased autonomy; some  level staff.
functions are spun off into semi-autonomous
agencies operating on an increasingly commer-  4  Assuming minimal, essential levels of
cial basis.  personnel establishment and budgetary control,
unified pay and classification could be relaxed in
By contrast, other industrialized  countries,  developing countries, following the lead of
such as Singapore, have retained more traditional,  increasing numbers of advanced countries that
largely centralized civil service structures,  pursuing  have done this.
only incremental improvements  in specific aspects
of CSM.  *  Given the urgency of other CSM tasks,
lower priority should be assigned to reform
Nunberg speculates about what is likely to  involving performance pay, the benefits of which
work best in developing country administrations:  have yet to be demonstrated in the public sectors
of developed countries. The management
Centralized civil service management  requirements and costs of installing performance
models provide the best starting point for most  pay systems can be considerable and employee
developing countries because decentralized  resistance may subvert such efforts. But perfor-
agency systems require technological and human  mance-related promotion systems, even if
resources beyond their capabilities. Some better-  imperfectly implemented, can help move devel-
endowed countries could use certain agency-type  oping country civil service values toward
features selectively. Such administrations could  standards of competence and merit.
establish strategic plans to move toward a fuller
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As thb link between efficient public administration and the state's ability to play an
effective role in economic development is more acutely perceived, the reform of civil services has
become a major goal of World Bank lending. Pursued mainly in the context of structural adjustment,
civil service reform has  thus  far  meant  programs to  contain  the cost  and  reduce  the size of
government under the weight of dramatic fiscal constraints.  It has emphasized public employment
cuts and  the  revision of civil servants'  pay structures.  These  early downsizing efforts,  though
necessary to reverse long term trends of govermment  expansion and decay, have constituted only the
initial phase of the reform process. Where successful,  such initiatives have resulted in a "leanere  but
not necessarily "meanere state; a state, that is, which can competently formulate policy, implement
programs and deliver services.
In the era of reform,,  shrinking states will have to do more with fewer but, it is hoped,
better  human resources.  Indeed, the need to recruit, develop, and motivate competent cadres to
carry out  core government functions becomes especially pressing as the public sector contracts,
focusing its attention on  a limited number of critical activities.  Sustaining adequate government
performance in these areas will depend on improvements in civil service management (CSM) -
narrowly  defined here as the management of staff for the core public service -- over the medium and
long term.
Unfortunately, the increased demand for better human resource management in the
public sector  comes at  a  time when basic personnel management  in  many developing country
administrations is in a state of collapse.  Lacking suitable rewards and sanctions, civil servants are
often  unmotivated  and  demoralized.  They  are  frequently  ill-equipped  and  insufficiently or
inappropriately prepared to do the jobs required of them. In many countries, qualified personnel are
difficult to recruit and retain because the private or overseas labor markets offer better alternatives.
Mechanisms  of authority and often probity have broken down.
That LDC civil services might in the foreseeable future achieve efficient, much less
effective,  delivery of services  to the client public has become an increasingly  elusive goal. At present,
developing  country governments dispose of only limited means to confront their problems. Most third2
world administrations have inadequate  systems of  establishment control,  personnel  information
management, and manpower planniag.  They cannot provide sufficient incentives to motivate staff
performance.  Appropriate career development and training programs for civil servants are mainly
non-existent.
Although Bank operations have begun to addr,,is some of these problems (30 projects
have included CSM components since 1981 -- s;ee  Tables 1-2), efforts to date have been ad hoc and
experimental in  nature, constrained. by a  limited knowledge of what  constitutes  'best  practice'.
Technologies used in these programs have tended to be drawn from a narrow range of advanced
country models, in some instances applying outmoded or unsound techniques, unrepresentative of
leading-edge civil service management approaches. Because rapid changes are taking place in global
thining  about. the management and motivation of human resources for both the private and public
sectors, and because developing country programs must be able to assess the latest wisdom on these
issues, it is particularlv vital to scrutinize CSM assistance strategy at this time.
This paper seeks to provide some guidance for Bank borrowers on how to manage
their civil  services better.  It does so by surveying  stuccessful  or promising  experiences in advanced and
newly industrialized countries.  The objective is to identify models or elements therein which might
be usefully applied and adapted to LDC administrations for improved government performance.
Two caveats should be duly noted.  First, a st ict construction of the notion of 'best
CSM practice" is simplistic.  Despite significant global commonalities, the diversity of successful
personnel administration approaches, even in apparently similar environments, belies the possibility
of  a  standardized  modeL  Differences  in  socio-cultural, economic, and  political  endowments
significantly  affect what is feasible in a given country, thus undermining attempts at uniformity. The
search should be for "good"  management practice suitable for particular country conditions. Second,
the human resource focus of CSM used in this paper represents an attempt to narrow the scope of
an  already overwhelming topic.  The  links between  personnel  ptactices  and  other  aspects of
administration, especially financial management, are, of course, intricate.  In  this last respect, a
forthcoming  CECPS  analysis of  public  financial  management  reforms  in  OECD  countries
complements the present study.'
The paper analyzes the implications for specific CSM functions of two (ideal) types
of administrative systems: a traditional model of centralized, hierarchical, administrative control and
a "reform"  model that, utilizing  sophisticated information management mechanisms,  devolves  greater
financial  and personnel responsibilities  down the administrative line and relies increasingly  on market
signals to orient civil service management behavior.
The industrialized country experience with these two broad models is examined in the
hope, if not the hypothesis, that the selective introduction of successful and/or innovative CSM
'See, Michael Stevens, "Innovations  in Public Expenditure Management in OECD Countrics", forthcoming, isi2.  Organrzauiu-a,
structural and, for lack of a less iritating term, "proces" aspects of civil service management are also important (and too often ignored
in Bank work) but could not be reasonably accommodated in the scope of this study.  Ile  terse reference to the political (and socio-
cultural) dimensions of civil  service reform is not intended to underestimate the centrality of these variables, but rather to acknowledge
that these ame  in themseles  vast topics, the subject of extensive  literatures; it was not possible to address them seriously in this review.
Finally,  despite the paperes  human resoure  focus, the mbric, "civil  service management"  Is used in place of the more precise 'civil  servie
pesonnel management"  on grounds of linguistic  economy.3
TABLE I
BAMK OPERATIONS  WITH CIVIL  SERVICE  MANAGEMENT  REFORM  CONIEUfS,  19981-1991
(thrnwuph  July  31,  1991)  \a
Region/Country  Ln/Cr  Ln/Cr  Amamt  Approval
Type  NMer  (UeSS  m)  Oate
AFRICA
Angola  Eco.  got. Cacity  Cr  227N  23.00  06/91
Carn  Eco.  Mgt.  Ln 3110  9.00  07/89
CAR  TAL  cr  1150  4.00  05/81
CAR  TAL It  Cr  1581  8.00  04/85
CAR  Eco.  Mgt.  Cr  1971  13.20  12/88
Gabon  TAL  Ln  3114  5.00  08/89
Ghan  SA Instit.  Support  Cr  1778.  10.80  04/87
Ghana  Eco.  Mgt.  Support  Cr  2224  15.00  03/91
Guinea  TAL  Cr  1559  9.50  03/85
Guinea  Eco.  Mgt.  Suoport  11  Cr  1963  14.50  11/88
Guinea  Bissau  'AL  11  Cr  1935  9.70  06/88
Matawi  :D  Cr  2036  11.30  06/89
Mati  TAL  Cr  1307  10.40  12/82
Mauritania  Develapoent  Mgt.  Cr  1865  10.00  12/87
Senegal  Oevelopimtnt  Mgt.  Cr  1910  17.00  05/88
Sudan  PE & Eco.  Mgt.  Cr  1789  9.00  05/87
Togo  TAL III  Cr  1600  6.20  05/85
Uganda  TAL 11  Cr  1434  14.20  12/83
Zaire  Eco.  Mgt.  &  ID  Cr  1832  12.00  06/87
AStA
Bangledesh  Pub.  Admin.  Cr  1349  12.00  04/83
Papue  New Guinea  Pub.  Sector  Training  Ln  3290  20.80  01/91
EMENA
Y&men  Arab  Republic  10  Pub.  Adnin.  Cr  2015  10.80  05/89
LAC
Argentina  Pub.  Sector  Reform  TA  Ln  3362  23.00  06/91
Botivia  Eco.  Mgt.  Strengthen.  Cr  1977  9.70  12/88
Bolivia  Pub.  Fin.  Mgt.  11  Cr  2279  11.30  06/91
Costa  Rica  TAL  Ln 2519  3.50  04/85
Haiti  TAL  Cr  1786  3.00  04/87
Jamica  Pub.  Admin.  Reform  Ln  2423  4.50  05/84
Jamice  Fin.  & Program Mgt.  Ln  3386  11.50  06/91
Peru  Pub.  Sector  Mgt.  Ln  2204  10.20  09/82
\a  Operations  in  which  training  is  the  only  civil  service
reform  comaonent  have  been  excluded.-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
TABLE 2
CONPONENTS  OF CIVIL  SERVICE  MANAGENENT  REFORM  OPERATIONS,  1981-1991  (through  July  31.  1991)
Establishment  Controlt
Diagnostic  Nanagement  Information  and  Satary  and Grading  Organizational
Work  Manpower Planning  Systems  Structure  Reforu  Development  /a  Training  /b
Angolo  Eco.  Mgt.  Cap.  Argentina  PS Ref  TAL  Bangladesh  PA  Argent'na  PS Ref  TA  Algeria  TAL
Bangladesh  PA  Bangoladesh  PA  Bolivia  Eco.  Ngt.  Bangladesh  PA  Angola  Eco Ngt Cap Bldg
Bolivia  Eco.  Nglt.  Bolivia  Eco.  Ngt.  Costa  Rica  TAL  CAR TAL If  Argentina  Pub.  Sect.  Mgt.
Bolivia  Pub  Fin  Mgt  ll  CAR  TAL I  Ghana SA Inst.  Sup.  Ghana SA Inst.  Sup.  Argentina  PS Ref.  TA
Costa  Rica  TAt  CAR  TAL 11  Ghana  Eco.  Mgt.  Sup.  Ghona  Eco.  Ngt.  Sup.  Bangladesh  PA
Gabon  TAL  Gabon  TAL  Haiti  TAL  Jamuica  PA  Benin  TA Ptn.  &  Eco.  Mgt.
Ghana  Eco.  Ngt. Sup.  Ghan SA Inst.  Sup.  Jamaica  PA  Juuaica  Fin.  Mgt.  Bolivia  Pub.  Fin.  Mgt.  It
Guinea  TAL  Ghana  Eco.  Mgt.  Sup.  Jamaica  Fin.  Mgt.  Mali  TAL  Bratil  PSM
Jamaica  PA  Jamaica  Fin.  Mgt.  Mauritania  Dev.  Mgt.  Mauritania  Dev.  Mgt.  Gabon  TAL
auritania  Dev. Mgt.  Mall  TAL  Peru  PSN  Papua  New Guinea  Ghana  SA Irst.  Sup.
Peru  PSH  Mauritania  Dev.  Mgt.  Togo  TAL  III  Pub.  Sect.  Train.  Ghana  Eco.  Ngt.  Sup.
Togo  TAL III  Senegal  Dev.  Mgt.  Peru  PSM  Guinea  TA Eco.  Mgt.
Yemen  Arab  R. IW  PA  Uganda  TAL  It  Senegal  Dev.  Mgt.  Guinea  Eco.  Ngt. 11
Yemen  Arab  R. ID  PA  Togo  TAt III  Haiti  Ed.  & Train.  IV
Uganda  TAt 11  Jme  ica  Fin.  & Prog.  Mgt.
Yemen  Arab  R. ID  PA  Jordan  Marpover  Dev.
Madagascar  Acct.  & Mgt.
Malavi  10
Maif  Eco.  Mgt.  & Train.
Mauritania  Dev.  Mgt.
Mauritanis  TAL 11
Morocco PA
Moaubique Eco.  * Fin.  Mgt.
Niger  Eco.  & Fin.  Mgt.
Niger  Eu.
PapU New Guinea  PS Train.
Peru  PSM
Rwanda  TA Pub.  Fin.  Mgt.
Senegal  Dev.  Mgt.
Trinidad  A  Tobago  TAL
Uganda  lA.  II
Yemn Arab  Rep. ID  PA
Zmbia TAL 11
/a  Building  an  strengthening  of personnel  management  institutions.
/b  Includes  support  for  management development  institutes,  schools  of  public  administration,  overseas  fellowships  and twinning  arrangements.5
approaches  could actuallv  enable some LDCs to "jump-start"  their own process  of administrative
developrient. The paper represents  a fi,st cut at assessing  the real prospects  for such acceleration.
It must rely heavily  on conjecture,  beca,ise  persuasive  cross-national  comparisons  of the impact  of
different  CSM  systems  on govemment  pt rformance  are non-existent,  because  much  of what is  being
carried  out in the name of the "reformin,g"  administrations  is of extremely  recent origin  and has still
to be properly  evaluated,  and  because  judglments  about the potential  viability  of CSM  approaches  in
developing  countries  derive  more  from  accumulated  operational  wisdom  rather than empirical  studies
of feasibility.
The objective  of this  exercise  is emphatically  not the analysis  of LDC experience  with
civil  service  reform. Such  experience  should  be assessed  systematically  in studies  with that express
purpose. The assumption  here is that the reader is familiar  with developing  country  administrative
concerns  and is seeking  sources f fresh ideas  for addressing  them.
The paper is  organized  as follows:  section  II provides  a brief overview  of some  global
trends in advanced-country  civil  service  management. Section  EII  highlights,  in specific  countries,
successful  practice that holds potential for Bank borrowers,  sometimes  couching  options in the
context  of current  debate. The focus  is  on key  elements  of personnel  management  systems.  For each
element,  the discussion  narrmws  to suggestions  for the possible  application  or adaptation  of these
approaches  to LDCs. The final  section  offers  general  conclusions  and points  to directions  for further
work
I.  GLOBAL  TRENDS  IN CIVIL  SERVICE  MANAGEMENT:  THE CQNTEXT  OF REFORM
Significant  changes  have been occurring  since the mid-1970s  in developed  country
public  administrations.  Governments  ha"e sought to reshape  rigid,  hierarchical,  nineteenth-century
bureaucracies  into more flexible,  decentrs  lized,  client-responsive  organizations,  compatible  with late
twentieth  century  technological  and economnic  requirements.  For some  countries,  reforms  have  been
sweeping,  representing  programs  of radicai,  systemic  transformation.  Other countries  have pursued
more modest  strategies  of incremental  improvements  in specific  aspects  of civil  service  management
while  conserving  the basic  core of administrative  structure  and practice.
The cases  in this study  can be situated  along a continuum  of change  between  these
two  poles. 2 New  Zealand,  Australia,  the U.K, and Sweden  cluster  at the systemic,  reformist  end of
the scale  while  the Asian  cases,  the U.S.A.,  and Germany  have  taken more  incrementalist  approaches
France,  the Netherlands,  and Canada fall in the middle. Differences  in emphasis  notwithstanding,
some  basic  commonalities  characterize  global  civil  service  management  ir. the last two  decades. To
convey  the contextual  background  for the subsequent  discussion  of specific  CSM  approaches,  a brief
sketch  of the broad thrust  of developed-country  administrative  reform  is provided  below.
2Examination  of public penonnel management  approaches in 11 OECD and NIC countries formed the empirical  basis for the study.
In addition to key informant interviews,  relevant secondary materials  were reviewed.6
Rethinking  Civil  Service  Managemen'  of Reforn
Disillusionment  with  ':0  ';  .. '.  -tralized control  of civil  service  management  began
to pervade advanced  country civil setvices  in the 1970s  and 1980s. Such controls were initially
introduced  by governments  as a means  to assure  impartial  (mainly  uniform)  application  of personnel
policies,  to professionalize  public  service  cadres,  and to rout out patronage  and corruption.?  Having
largely achieved these aims, however,  governments  were increasingly  coniing  under pressure to
improve  administrative  efficiency  and to render faster,  better and more  responsive  services  to a client
public  whose requirements  were becoming  mcre diverse. Under greater fiscal strain and facing
intensified, wide-ranging citizen-customer  demands, tightly controlled, uniform, centralized
bureaucracies  were attacked for failing to provide effective service delivery  at affordable  cost
Countries  thus embarked  oin  a search for ways  to reduce  civil  service  expenditures  and at the same
time to improve  performance  standards  in government.  Several  trends in civil  service  management
reform  emerged  from  this quest. In distinct  phases,  these  reforms --  variously  denominated  the "new
public  management  movement"  or the "new  managerialism"  --  moved  swiftly  from one country  to
another, manifesting  a kind of global  demonstration  effect.
The first  reform  phase,  commonly  called  "cutback  managen,ent,"  consisted  of measures
to curb public spending and civil service staffing  in response to fiscal constraints. Downsizing
exercises  were implemented  in a number  of countries,  including  Canada,  t'ie U.K. Australia,  New
Zealand,  Japan, and the USA. Cutback  management  was  essentially  neutral ib"tween  ieft-  and right-
leaning political  regimes. Labor governments  in Austalasia pursued fat as avidly  as did staunch
conservatives  in the U.K and the U.S. Staff reductions  were mainly  achieved  through  recruitment
slowdowns  or freezes, natural attrition, early retirement, reorganization  and/or privatization  of
government  activities,  and, to a lesser  extent, through  involuntary  employment  reductions. Some
examples  of cutback  management  include  the United  States'  Reduction-in-Force  program  of the early
1980s,  a Japanese program  to reduce civil  service  staff by five percent between 1986  and 1992,  the
Dutch government's  downsizing  exercise  reducing  civil  service  persoinnel  by two  percent per annum
in the mid-1980s  through  a privatization  and  efficiency  audit program,  and the UK's reduction  of civil
service  staff by 22 percent between 1979  and 1989. While  cutback  management  programs  brought
about reductions  in public  employment  in a number  of countries  (See Figures  1,  2 and 3), government
spending  reductions  nonetheless  proved  difficult  to sustain,  largely  due to the overwhelming  burden
of entrenched  transfer  payment  systems. 4
Recognition of  the  limits of cutback management in effecting sustained cost-
containment  and efficiency  improvements  led to a broader reform  approach,  one which  emphasized
more cost-efficient  utilization  of "inputs"  in the provision  of public  services. Input-focused  reforms
swept  through  a number  of developed  countries,  including  New  Zealand,  Austra.a, and the U.K  In
3See, Willam Mosher and J. Donald Kingsley,  Public Personnel Administration.  Harper and Brothers: New York, 1941,  for a history
of early civil service reform.  Successful professionalization  and sanitation of the civil service in many countries in the late nineteenth
ihrough mid-twentieth  centuries also coincided  with rising levels  of educational attainment, legal  and constitutional  reforms, wider suffrage
and the strengthening  of mechanisms  of parliamentary  oversight  and accountability. These  parallel achievements  must be recalled when
contemplating  emulative administrative reform in today's developing  countries.
4Christopher Hood, Andrew Dunsire, and Lynne Tlomson, 'Rolling Back the State: Tlatcherism,  Fraserism and Bureaucracy",  in
Governance:  An International  Journal  of Polic  and_Adrinistration Vol. 1, No. 3 (July 1988), pp. 243-270. Also, as Figures 4 and 5
suggest,  civil  service employment  reductions only tell pan of the story. General government employment  (including central, regional and
local figures) also need to be analyzed.(mousanid)  ~osns
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _~~~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  i 
..... ... L....  CD
*  a  .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..  ....
I  Izv~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C
. .........  .-.-
I,~~~~~~~~~............
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.....  . I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...........
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  ......  ....
4~~~~~~~~U
....  ....  .ands)......anCD
.. .. .......  IA~~~~
. . ..  ...~~~~~~~~~~.........
xii 
Tm-Lh1
I  I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..  ........  ..
1 ZILILZI  I~~~~~~~~~~~~...  ...  .... ....... Z  ,(Mousands)  (thounds)
- - .. _ 
Ig  &~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
w  L.  ID.  ..
i^ ..  . ..
%  _  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..  T  ....... ............. ::y.  .i
,  s  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~... ..  ...  ...  . .......................  x  xxQx....  ..........
;  =t  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  ... . r,'...,..  ,  .. X  :..  .... 4 [ |  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.-.-..-.  ...  .. .....  ...  ...
00
.I.  . _  .
|,  A > Hs  . X  *,  _  J  = ,  I  I  0
^  _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..  _iB-....  ...  ........  ..  1.....
I~~~~
g~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  .. ... ,.,..
|  o  l  X ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~., .y.  ...  ,  .,, .
(  d.)  (,  .'n  ._  :  . . .. ds)  ...... s) a___  __  8  __a  a  b  f  a  Y
a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c
(ftumar4s)  (VOUnrAft)  ~  ~
..  ..  ..  ...  ...  ....  ... . .. .
..  ... ..  ..  .... ....  .....
I.  I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.......  ...
I.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~....  .....  ......
I.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..  ........... ..I........
I  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  ~  .....  ....  . . ._........_.
I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~""..,.....
'5  - 222L~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..  .... ............ 
-3-  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i2IZI2~~~~~~~~.  ........
_ _  _  I ;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..  ......
I__  77E7n1f_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.......
I  I~~~~~~~~~~~..  .....
I  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.....  ....
. ....  . . . ... 9
Figure  2
PERCENTAGE  CHANGES  IN CIVIL  SERVICE  EMPLOYMENT









UnRed Kingdom  -a  .-
7  Total  change  Average annual change
Note: Changes  in Gennany  are based  on 1985-89  time period.
Source: CECPS10
Figure  3
Civil  Servants  per 100 in the Population  in Selected  OEC1D  CountTles
376  36 
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U/nited  Kingdom  -1.3  m
Japan
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the latter, they were embodied in the Financial Management Initiative (FMI).5  Building upon a
series of "efficiency  scrutinies" begun in 1979 to identify potential budgetary savings through audits
of individual  government departments, the FMI was officially  created in 1982  as a progrnm desiged
to  introduce innovative, computerized financial information management systems.  The program
sought to make the budgetary process more transparent  and thereby more accountable to higher
management and political levels. Department heads were to be given responsibility  for efficient use
of resources.  Departments were subject to cash limits  and, with improved information management,
were held accountable for control of running costs.
FMI reforms were largely confined to better management of financial inputs through
strengthening of information technology. Devolution of responsibility was limited to the top level
departments.  These improvements, concentrating mainly on financial inputs, proved necessary  but
insufficient to the task of making govemment performance more efficient and responsive.  Several
years into the reform process, the need to deepen reforms by increasing flexibility  and devolving  still
more responsibility  and accountability to lower managerial levels was perceived. In the U.K,  these
more fundamental reforms were taken up in what came to be called the Next Steps Program.'
Initiated  in  1988,  Next Steps  has sought to  relax further  central  financial and
management controls and to devolve more responsibilities  to the line managerial level.  In a variant
on similar reforms being implemented in Australia amd,  even mnre radically, in New Zealand, the
Next Steps administrative  reform has spun off various central government functions to newly formed
executing agencies. The reform is fashioned loosely  after the Swedish  administrative  model, in which
semi-autonomous agencies have operated for centuries with minimal  central controls.  While policy
functions are retained in central departments, agencies are charged with service delivery and, through
the person of their Chief Executive (CE), are held responsible for efficient use of inputs and the
achievement of performance targets.  The ministers to whom they report are ultimately responsible
for program outcomes.  Organizational culture  in agencies is supposed to  shift accordingly to
emphasize efficiency and service.  These  new administrative relationships between agencies and
parent departments are embodied in what is known in  the U.K. as the  framework agreement.!
Implicit in the agency reform movement is a challenge to the traditional notion of a unified civil
service.  Too large and unwieldy to be managed as one organization, govemment as envisaged by
Next Steps architects and other Agency reform proponents is instead a collection of interrelated but
separately functioning businesses.S
5Tle U.K cxperience  is presented here to illustrate the nature of agency  reform programs. While it differs in numerous  respects  from
other agency modeLs,  it also shares many traits in common with Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden,  and has served as a model for
particular aspects of reform in other countries, including  France and Canada.
6'The  analogues  to the FMI-Neat  Steps reform sequence in Australia  were the Financial  Management  Improvement  Program  and Public
Service  Reforms.  In New Zealand, the Financial Management Reforms, the Corporatization Program and the State Services  Act took
reforms even further.
7Framework agreements establish the policies and aims of the government and the agency; the respective roles of the minister,
permanent secretary and the CE; the financing available to the agency, the estimates process and the degree of financal flsbility
permitted; the annual operational or business plan, the annual performance agreement negotiated  with the agency,  indicating  performance
targets, indicators and monitoring arrangements,  and staffing policies (e.g., creation of new posts, pay flexdbilities).  Simibr agreements
exist in New Zealand and Australia. Although there has been discussion of introduction of formal contractual agreements in Sweden,
currently arrangements are more informal.
heEtorno~mist,  December 21, 1991,  pp. 6667.14
Agency reforms are stiDl  at a very early stage.'  Many uncertainties remain, including
questions about the degree to which agencies should be held accountable politically,  whether the
central financial authorities will  cede enough autonomy to agencies to allow the concept to work, and
whether the focus on performance targets, unit costs and individual agency independence will  erode
the traditional public service ethos.'°
While agency reforms are being pursued fully in only a few countries, many of the
"new managerialist"  principles driving them are informing other, less comprehensive reforms in civil
service management elsewhere  as well.  A number of  "incrementalist' administrations are  also
undertaking management improvements  which reflect an emergent view of government as a service
delivery conglomerate.  These  improvements draw on  a  range  of  private  sector  management
approaches,  including:  organizational  mission,  corporate  planning,  customer  responsiveness,
performance incentives, and the use of new advanced computer technologies.
To  what  degree  should  traditional  administrative  controls  give  way  to
managerialist/new  public management approaches in managing civil services? This question is at the
heart  of  the  ongoing  public administration debate  in  developed  countries.  In  the  meantime,
developing country administrations must make choices about how best to develop their own civil
service management systems. This question must be answered by looking at specific CSM functions,
determining their priority in the overall task of administrative development for a given country, and
assessing  what practice will  work best under which conditions. Without proffering definitive solutions,
the following  sections try to analyze appro  Ales  that have proved useful in advanced countries and
to extrapolatt  lessons for likely successes in adapting them in developing contexts.
III. GOOD CIVIL  SERVICE  MANAGEMENT  PRACTICE:  ELEMENTS  OF A SUCCESSFUL
APPROACH
This section focuses on those civil service management functions which, it is argued,
are priority items on developing country administrative  agendas. These functions constitute a minimal
set  of  essential  tasks  that  must  be  well executed  if  government  personnel  are  to  perform
professionally  and effectively. The discussion  therefore concentrates on three principal areas of civil
service management."  It begins by examining  the organization and management of the system itseiff
including questions  of  how  to  structure  institutions  for  crucial  maintenance  functions  like
establishment control.  The focus then shifts to the quality of human inputs. This involves  programs
9Actually,  the Swedes are revisiting  and reforming their own system in light of reforms taking place in other administrations.
l0As will be discussed at various points in this paper, the jury is still very much out on the effectiveness  of agency reforms in their
countries of origin. The difficulties  in assessing the merit of these programs  are compounded by the familiar presence, informally  noted
by  some observers,  of the Hawthorne  effect, whereby  the introduction  of  m environmental  change stimulates performance improvements
over the short-run, but m3y,not  necessarily  have enduring positive impact. Some of the most fervent advocates of the agency model may
be affected by this phenomenon. See, The Economist.  ibid.
I"The  choice of CSM areas is dictated by the importance of the function to government performance in developing  countries, and by
the extent to which  innovative  or interesting  approaches have been identified in developed  countries. Many important CSM functions and
innovations  will unfortunately escape these criteria, but, in the interest of manageable scope, could not be treated here.15
for recruitment  of  personnel as well as development of  elite  cadres through  senior  executive
schemes.'  Finally, the discussion  centers on incentives and their relationship to staff performance,
concentrating on pay, classification,  and performance evaluation.
A.  ORGANIZING  CIVIL  SERVICE  MANAGEMENT:  INSTMJTUIONALIZING
ESTABLISHMEENT  CONTROL AND PLANNING
Choices about optimal organizational  structures for civil service management and the
assignment of responsibilities for key personnel functions are both critically important to successful
administrative development in LDCs. Civil  service reforms springing from fragile, uncoordinated or
politically  impotent institutions typically  founder in developing settings, while those with a stronger
institutional base of support have a better chance of succeeding. This section analyzes some of the
organizational qualities of well-functioning personnel systems in industrialized countries and then
suggests  which features might be most useful in establishing a solid institutional foundation for CSM
activities in developing administrations. The discussion  begins with the organizational arrangements
for overall personnel policy and  management and  then concentrates on  the  institutional set-up
specifically  for establishment control and planning, a vital CSM activity.
Two basic models of CSM organization predominate in developed administrations.
One is a model of centralized control allowing  a limited degree of deconcentration.  The other is a
system with increasing decentralization, flexibility  and delegation of CSM authority to the line level.
For the cases studied, the Asian countries, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and (to  a lesser
degree) the USA and Canada conform to the first model, while the U.K, Australia, New Zealand,
and Sweden either now fit or are moving  toward the second.
In addition to a high degree of control and professional standardization, centralized
systems of civil service management display a number of common traits.  First, for most modem
administrations, centralization implies not  a single, central monolfithic  organ controlling all system
personnel movements, but  rather some degree of shared personnel authority exercised by several
entities at the central level. The arrangement is often tripartite, usually  with powers divided among
a policy guidance body, an oversight agency which helps ensure fair and meritorious practices, and
a  financial control cum monitoring organ.  Such systems create  checks and  balances, ensuring
redundancyU and  fairness, and  they curb  excessive concentration  of  authority  for civil service
management. They work best when limited to a very few organs with clear division  of labor and good
mechanisms for coordination.  Singapore is an illustrative case.  Authority for  public personnel
functions in Singapore is divided among the Ministry of Finance's Budget Division (which handles
manpower control), its Public Service Division (which develops policy, coordinates implementation
and is responsible for pay and grading,  training and productivity  improvement), and the Public  Service
Commission,  (which approves higher-level  appointments and disciplinary  actions). Singapore's  success
can be contrasted with less functional arrangements elsewhere.  In the USA, where clear lines of
17'le  subject of training, admittediv important to the development of civil service cadres, is not treated here in order to limit this
papers breadth.
13See  Martin Landau, on the  need for redundancy  in successful  organizations  "Redundancy,  Rationality  and the Problem of Duplication
and Overlap",  in Public Administration Review  29. 4 (July-August):  346-58,  1969.16
responsibility  are not drawn,  and in Canada,  where personnel  policy  organs  proliferate,  centralized
power-sharing arrangements have frequently led to fragmentation and policy confusion."
4
Successful  centralized models elevate the  status of  the  personnel function in
government by makdng  key CSM organs directly responsible  to  political authority, often with
designation  as principal  agents for major system  reforms. In Japan, for instance,  the Management
Coordination  Agency,  part of the personnel  "troika'  in central  government,  operates  under the direct
authority  of the Prime Minister,  coordinating  CSM  policies  and ensuring  their direct  responsiveness
to  political  requirements.  The Japanese attach prestige to  the personnel function by placing
deconcentrated  personnel  divisions  near the top of line  ministry  hierarchies  and identifying  personnel
officers as "high fliers with good prospects for eventual appointment to  elevated government
positions."
In the interest of bureaucratic  flexibility  and more  rapid  operations,  some  centralized
systems  delegate  selected  personnel  management  authority  to deconcentrated  levels. For example,
routine personnel  information  management,  especially  for lower-level  staff, might be handled by
departments,  subject  to central policy  guidelines  and safeguards.  Still,  the hallmark  of this model  is
the retention of close, central supervision  of functions  with crucial  implications  for the financial
soundness  of the service,  such as establishment  control and planning.
In contrast  to these  traditional  systems,  several  countries  are developing  an alternative
model  of decentralized  civil  service  management.  This model  increases  the decisional  autonomy  of
line managers  on most personnel  matters,  leaving  only broad policy  guidelines  to be worked  out at
the center. 1'  Such  decentralization  is most advanced  in New  Zealand  and Sweden.  Sweden's  central
141In the USA, powers are divided  among the Office of Personnd Management, Office of Management of the Budget, and the Merit
System Protection Board, with functions still being disputed among the three, calfing  attention to the lack of coordination in the system
and the consequent difficulty  in achieing  needed pesonel  reforms. Critks of the Canadian  system highght  the fragmentation  of CSM
policy  among five  official  and non-official  institutios  the Treasury Board, the Treasury Board Secretariat,  the Public  Semice Commisso,
the Privy Council Office, the Auditor General's Office, and the Public Policy Forum.  See, Cohn Campbell. Govemment Under Stess
Political Executives  and Kev  Bureaucrats in Washington,  London. and Ottawa, Toronto: University  of Toronto Press, 1983,  pp. 228-255.
1sFrance and Sweden have also made recent efforts to elevate the personnel function to higher status.  To support CSM reforms in
France, the General Dimetorate for the Public Service,  once an appendage of the Prime Minister's  Office, became part of a free-standing
Ministry of Public Service and Reform in the late 1980s.  The head of the Ministry was upgraded to Cabinet Status.  In Sweden,  the
Ministry  of Public Administration  was formed in 1983  to spearhead the public sector renewal progrm.
16While  moving toward a more flmdble,  increasingly  decentralized  structure of personnel management  in the public sector, Australia
has not moved toward  full 'agency"  autonomy  in CSM, but rather retains departments headed by Depanment Secretaies.  Within  running
cost ceilings,  though, the Department of Finance has delegated establishment  control to the departments,  which, in fact, have  responsibility
for most operational aspects of personnel management,  with the exception  of the Senior Exeutive Service  over which the Department of
Finance retains control of numbers and levels.  while the Public Service  Commission  exerts quality  control and assures due process. In
addition,  responsibility  for efficiency  scrutinies  was moved recently from a central Efficiency  Scrutiny Unit, formed in the footsteps of the
UK, to the departmental level,  but reportedly, this has led to their demise.
The UK is also operating with a decidedly hybrid system in the midst of reforms unfolding through the Next Steps Program
described earlier.  Al present, CSM powers are distributed much as in the centralized systems in a tripartite division  of tabor among the
Treasury, with responsibility  for all financial aspects of pemonnel administration including pay, pensions,  manpower control and labor
negotiations; the Office of the Minister for the Civil Service,  which, as part of the Cabinet Office under the Prime Minister,  develops
personnd policies and guidelines for recruitment, staff appraisal, promotions. training and career development, and controls senior
management  appointments;  and the Civil  Service  Commission,  an independent body  attached to OMCS which  oversees  senior remuitment.
In addition, the Prime Minister's Efficiency  Unit supervises departmentally executed efficiency  audits and continues as a driving force
behind further CSM changes17
personnel "troika"  -- the Ministry of Public Admiristration, the  National Audit Bureau, and the
Agency for Administrative Development -- performs minimal oversight, sets policy guidelines, and
promotes and disseminates sound and innovative practice.  These oversight functions aside, and
although pay guidelines are still  determined centrally, responsibility  for the majority  of personnel tasks
now rests with 100 semi-autonomous agencies and 13 small policy ministries have responsibility for
the majority of personnel tasks.  In New Zealand, a central agency, the State Services Commission
(SSC), is assigned only a quality control and oversight role.  It advises government departments on
policy and standards, monitors the perfc.rmance of departments and chief executives, oversees the
new Senior Executive Service and oversees the selection of candidates for appointment to  chief
executive positions. Most aspects of personnel management, including recruitment, promotions and
dismissals, position classification, manpower control, and almost all training are now handled by
executive departments which, under the purview of small headquarters departments, carry out the
bulk of government functions.
In principle, decentralizing CSM functions allows managers to tailor staffing to real
requirements with more flexibility. The absence of central controls means these decisions can be
made rapidly and in response to local market conditions.  Note, however, that decentralization of
personnel management functions,  even where it has been taken farthest, is being implemented in the
context of elaborate, technologically  sophisticated systems  of information and financial management,
utilizing  complex and expensive  computer software and hardware in order to maintain tight reins on
running costs. Technical training of staff throughout government has been necessary  just to run these
systems. In addition, good financial and personnel management skills must be present down the line
in order to make such arrangements work. Managers must Lb.  prepared to make a range of financial
and personnel decisions, and line staff need sufficient technical capability to  administer routine
personnel movements.  Capacity to feed appropriate information back up through the system also
needs to be present at decentralized levels. The importance of these types of organizational issues
is illustrated clearly in the exercise of such key functions as establishment control.
Establishment Control:  Organizing Crucial Functions
Recent experience with public sector reforms in developing countries clearly shows
that building sound establishment control and  planning practice is a necessary condition for the
success of other  civil service management improvements."  Among the industrial country cases
examined for  this  study,  the  centrally organized  civil services appear  to  perform  these tasks
Increasingly,  departments and, as they develop,  agencies are being given more flexibility  for managing lower and middle-level
staff, and on a limited bi sis, professional  and technical staff at higher levels. While pay bargaining  and the staffing of the vast majority
of high  level positions  continue to be centralized,  the prowss of decentralizing  many  personnel management  functions is underway  througb
the Next Steps Program. The Framework Agreements negotiated between the departments and Treasury are starting to provide Chief
Executives  with personnel  management  flexibilities  suited to the particular  activities  and needs of their agencies. Eventually,  the civil  service
is expected to retain only a small policy core staff managed by the center with considerable autonomy for personnel functions at the
executing  agency level.
17See  Barbara Nunberg and John Nellis,  "Civil  Service  Reform and the World Bank,"  PRE Working  Paper, 1990,  and Louis de Merode,
"Civil  Service  Pay and Employment Reform in Africa: Selected Implementation  Experiences,"  World Bank, 1990,  for confirmation  of this
point.18
effectively."' They generally ensure a high level of system coordination, providing  policy makers and
planners with the necessa  degree of information and control both to stabilize public eanployment
during fiscal crises and to design manpower policies for the longer term.
Centralized models usually  operate tight monitoring systems through which nationally
determined staffing levels  are enforced via a coordinated effort of the central personnel authority and
the Finance Ministry. Relying heavily  on staff audits or inspection techniques, governments in Japan,
the Netherlands, France, Singapore and Korea have all sought to impose government-wide Ceilings
on staffing levels and to utilize forward planning to contain public employment.  Japan's cenetally
controlled system, for instance, has since the late  1960s facilitated government staff reductions.
Working in concert, the Management Coordination Agency enforces ministerial employment ceilings
mandated by law, while the National Personnel Authority adjusts civil serice  recruitment targets.
Since 1968, these ceilings have gradually been lowered, enabling the Japanese  to  move beyond
personnel stabilization to net reductions."'
A centralized model has also proven highly useful in Singapore's manpower control
program.  The Ministry of Finance's Budget Division sets staffing levels in its manpower plan, and
ministries must obtain the Budget Division's approval to add staff.  This enforces the government's
zero-growth policy (begun in 1988), with the Budget Division and the Public Service Commission
working in concert to control recruitment.  To support central efforts, the capacity to plan and
monitor staffing levels has also been developed at the ministerial level.  With training provided
centrally in staff  review techniques  by the  Management Services Department  and  the  Auditor
General's Office, all public agencies carry out comprehensive programs of manpower scrutinies to
identify superfluous functions and staff.
Other highly  centralized systems  include Korea and France.  Through tight control of
department manpower  levels, regulation of recruitment and periodic staff inspections, Korea has kept
public employment constant  since 1980 at  four  percent  of  the  fabor  force.  France  maintains
establishment control through the budget, carefully setting the number of officials in each salary  scale
and establishing fixed percentages for the number of officials who can be promoted from one salary
scale to another.  The key mechanism to adjust civil service numbers is recruitment restraint.
Having achieved these successes, some centralized systems of manpower control are
now relaxing their reins a bit, ceding limited discretion over staffing levels to departments and line
managers in the interest of greater flexibility. In Canada, for example, the Treasury Board Secretariat
allocates person-years to departments and only controls the number of senior managers. Departments
and agencies have gotten increased autonomy in distributing person-years among different levels of
staff, and  they can make special appointments amounting to  10% of their  base complement of
positions.
I8Data which  would provide definitive  bases for comparison  of different approaches to establishment  managemcnt  are not easy to come
by. Ile  goal of any system  should be to ensure adequate stability and forward planning of wappropriate,f  -- i.e. neither too high nor too
low - staffing levels  in order to avert emergency retrenchment programs. Sufficient  time series on civil  service numbers  with reasonable
comparability across  countries (i.e. with consistent definitions of what constitutes the civil service) are not available,however,  and thus
comparative indices of stable establishment management  are difficult to construct.
19!n Japan, multi-year forecasting  Is facilitated by the hign staff retention rate and the lifetime nature of public employment.19
Other countries have moved even more deliberately toward a distinctly  decentralized
manpower control model, using running cost controls as the  key determinant  of optimal staffing
levels. These systems impose across-the-board spending limits but are indifferent as to the level of
staff expenditures within recurrent  spending categories.  Typically, such systems require "micro-
management" of information inputs, with regularized reporting at short intervals to  the finance
authority responsible for overali system monitoring. While the U.R's  Next Steps program is moving
government in  this direction,'  Australia and  New Zealand  have progressed farthest  down the
decentralization road.  Individual departments or agencies have decisional autonomy over manpower
levels,  subject to central running cost monitoring. In Australia, line  departments may freely substitute
between staff and equipment expenditures. 21 Significantly,  this delegation has been accompanied
by a transfer of central monitoring authority from the now defunct Public Service Board to  the
Finance Ministry, thus tightening central controls through improved technologies. In the Australian
case, staffing levels have declined steadily since the mid-1980s,  due, some claim, to consistent and
firmly applied cash limits.  New Zealand's establishment arrangements are similarly  decentralized.
Departments report staff strength to Treasury on a trimester basis.  Manpower levels have been
reduced by 25%.  One cause of this reduction, it has been reported, is the newly acquired ability  of
managers to customize staffing levels to actual requirements.
Lessons:
The advantages of centralized civil service management organization  -- enhanced
control, coordination, capacity  for longer-term strategic  planning, and generally  greater political  access
for the personnel function -- probably favor such arrangements in many LDCs, where civil service
management lacks just these attributes, and questions of flexibility  and responsiveness are important
but secondary concerns.  The industrialized country experience shows, however, that centralization
does not imply (as frequently evolves in developing contexts) a center composed of a single, mega-
ministry of personnel management or public administration, or an omnipotent Ministry of Finance.
Stability and coordination is often achieved through a triumvirate of personnel organs which can
check each other, allowing  for sufficient system redundancy and backup of key functions. Operating
through well-institutionalized  coordination mechanisms,  these organs share responsibilities  for policy
formulation, merit protection, maintenance of standards, and financial monitoring.
Strong, centralized systems  exhibit some degree of deconcentration or delegation to
personnel units within line ministries.  The degree of delegation depends  on two variables: the
importance of the function and the technical and institutional capacity at the deconcentrated level.
In centralized advanced country CSM systems,  control over most personnel functions remains at the
center, but delegation of routine maintenance functions  to line entities is increasing,  sometimes with
ongoing support from central authorities.
-0The  present establishment control arrangements in the U.K. continue to give the central Treasury control over the number of staff
in the top three grades.  But Treasury now only monitors departmental staffing levels for the other grades to ensure these fall within
running  cost expenditure plans. With the assistance  of Treasury  inspectors,  departmental  staff inspection  teams carry out functional  reviews
to detect overstaffing  and grade drift.  Since 1979, the Prime Minister's Efficiency  Unit has worked with the departments to organize
efriciency  audits which identify  surplus staff as part of broader reviews  of departmental operations.
2 The conversion factor used to effect this substitution in the Australian case, however,  is not based on absolute parity between  staff
and equipment: KM.25  staff dollars equals $1.00 equipment dollars, reflecting  overhead costs such as superannuation,  etc., which have the
effect of inflating  total staffing costs. (John Baker. personal communication,  1/92.)20
As a general principle,  centralized  organizational  models probably  represent the
prudent course for developing country administrations,  typically  characterized by serious skill
shortages  below  high  bureaucratic  levels. Although  a few  LDCs  with  greater personnel  management
potential  might  reasonably  choose  sel- tive  deconcentration  as do some  advanced  countries,  even  the
most limited delegation would req  re  serious assessment  of  both human and infrastructural
requirements  and existing  capacity  throughout the system,  as well as careful planning  for future
training  and investment.
For crucial  functions  such as establishment  control and planning,  the case for LDC
centralization  is that much  stronger. Ubiquitous  concerns  about fiscal  restraint  and the poor track
record of so many LDCs in restraining  civil  sevice expansion  underscore  the need to keep civil
service numbers in tight check through central, uniform controls.'  While decentralized  CSM
models emerging  from Agency  reform experiences  may offer the future possibility  of enhanced
flexibility  and line manager  accountability,  they  also increase  system  susceptibility  to fraud,  patronage
and corruption  - clear  and present  dangers  to many  developing  country  administrative  establishments.
And implementing  decentralized  establishment  management  arrangements  requires tremendous
management  capabilities  and technical  capacity. In most developed  countries,  staff have needed
significant  training  to come  up to speed. Indeed,  to the extent that such  capacity  does not exist  down
the line,  the tendency  of central  organs  to "micro-manage'  through  excessive  information  requests  can
actually  result in an even  greater burden on the center than in an initially  centralized  system.  It goes
without  saying  that the skdll  cum technical  gaps in most LDCs are likely  to be that much  greater.
Management  of establishment  levels appears to have been particularly  successful-
meriting  close  scrutiny  and emulation  by LDCs--  in the Asian countries. They  have  installed  'smart'
programs  of forward  manpower  planning  that enable  governments  to avert overstaffing  crises  before
they happen. The relatively  low  and constant number  of civil  servants  in Japan, as compared  with
other OECD countries in recent years, attests (with the  aforementioned  data caveat) to  the
effectiveness  of this system  (Figure 3).  Planning  has been carried  out on a govemment-wide  basis
but with considerable  input from intensively  trained line ministry  personnel. Such training  (in the
case of Singapore,  training  administered  by central Ministry  staff for specific  tasks) can offset the
potential  risks  of an overly  rigid,  centralized  system,  providing  more balanced  participation  from the
periphery. Increasing  the skills  of line staff may  also set the stage for agency-type  reforms  which
could come later, at least in countries  where informatic  infrastructure  and overall skill  levels are
relatively  high.
22This  does not mean that some aspects  of establishment  control such as staff  inspection  or reporting  cannot be shared by decentralized
units, however.21
B.  IMPROV-ING  THE QUALrTY  OF HUMAN  RESODURCE  INPUTS: RECRUrTIG  AMD
BUILDING-LEADERSHIP  CADRE
Recruiting-  the Best and the Brightest
The recruitment  and initial  placement  of civil  servants  are crucial  determinants  of the
enduring  quality  of the civil  service.' The importance  of recruitment  is  weOl  understood  in successful
industrial country administrations; in contrast, relatively little attention has been given to this critical
area in the Bank's own civil service operations in developing countries.  Cultural traditions, labor
market behavior, and educational capacity all obviously condition the kind of recruitment system
whit h evolves in a particular country, but some common practices and some promising innovations
have emerged in industrial civil services.  As above, the aim of the following discussion is to cull
advanced country experiences for lessons applicable to developing civil services.
Recruitment systems  in industrial country civil services  break down into two principal
ideal types, with real cases falling between them:  1) closed entry, rigid hierarchical systems with
limited inter-class (and often inter-departmental) mobility  and highly selective entry requirements;
and, 2) more open systems  with lateral entry, greater vertical and sometimes horizontal mobility,  and
more flexible entry mechanisms. Japan, Korea, Singapore, Germany, the Netherlands, and France
fall roughly into the first category. The U.K. is in a transitional position. The U.S. (to a degree) and,
increasingly,  those countries subjecting recruitment to market considerations, including  Australia, New
Zealand, and Sweden, conform generally to the second.
Closed systems  (sometimes called "mandarin")  rely heavily  on selective recruitment to
maintain high performance standards. They perpetuate  the notion of a "chosen elite" in government
service.  Competitive recruitment takes place in a centralized context and  is usually ensured by
rigorous entrance examinations  or high scores on general educational tests.  Examinations are often
coupled with other selection mechanisms,  such as intensive interviews;  assessment centers or academic
degree or certificate requirements.  Frequently, recruits are pre-selected through single "feeder'
institutions in the higher educational or training system.  Often these highly competitive selection
criteria are used to lock qualified recruits into a closed system to which admission  is only possible at
the entry level.  Entrants go directly into a  particular class of service, usually on  a "fast track.'
Entrance into lower classes is based on less rigorous but still standardized  examination or educational
criteria, and movement  among  classes  is very restricted. Elite cadre entrants are generalists,  not
technical specialists, and they are inducted into a corps (often an inter-ministerial personnel group
serving as the basic managerial cadre for the civil service) or career stream, not hired for a specific
job. 24 They may  be easily  rotated,  if not throughout  government  as a whole,  then at least within  the
particular Ministry  directly  hiring them. Throughout the recruitment and training process, elite cadres
undergo intense socialization  to internalize core civil service values.
The two countries most nearly embodying  the mandarin ideal are Japan and France.
The backbone of the Japanese system is an extremely competitive examination with supporting
23Recruitment  has traditionally  had important consequences  for public sectors where separation of non-performers  has been difficult
if not impossible. To the actent that some governments may be moving toward impermanent contractual employment arrangements,
recruitment mistakes may be correctable and therefore less daunting.
24To  the ectent that the French corps system may also be related to professional  specialization,  it deviates from this ideal type22
interviews  to select staff for each of three career tracks: higher, middle and lower civil services. With
virtually  no exceptions, recruits enter a track for life; no mobility  operates among bureaucratic classes.
Because of the high social status traditionally afforded to government service as a profession, large
numbers of applicants compete for relatively few places.'  Civil servants are recruited directly into
individual ministries, where they remain throughout their careers.
One feeder educational institution -- Tokyo University,  established in the nineteenth
century expressly for public service training  -- produces the  lion's share  of higher civil service
recruits.  Most recruits are  law-generalists,  selected  for their  potential  for  highzr management
posts.'  The assumption is that supplementary technical training can be provided later, if needed,
by the recruiting ministry. Personal as well as professional and academic attributes are recruitment
criteria.
The  French  also rely on  competitive examinations to  determine entrance  to  the
exclusive  feeder training institutions for elite civil  service cadres, the Ecole National d'Administration
(ENA)  and other specialized 'grandes ecoles."  ENA students complete a one-year professional
internship followed  by 15 months of course work  Although the government is starting to open ENA
admission to functionaries already in service at lower grades with less elitist backgrounds, their
chances of succeeding  on  the competitive entrance exams are, in practice, low.  The system's
exclusivity  remains intact.
Some countries have modified  this model, intensifying  pre-service preparation through
practical internships.  For example, Singapore recruits elite cadres into a rigid class hierarchy but
relies on general educational credentials and interviews. It  also uses two-year, probationary, pre-
service, fast-track, "cadetships" with  rotating  ministerial assignments to  train  and  socialize the
mandarin class. The German practicum is another internship program combining on-the-job training
and course work for potential elite recruits before admission to service.
With the expansion of private sector opportunities and the comparative erosion of
public sector salaries in some countries, top graduates need to be wooed more aggressively  to join
elite government corps.  Several countries use scholarship bonds. These are training or educational
benefits provided in exchange for promises of time in service. In Singapore, bonds are used to recruit
scarce technical skills.  In France, entrants to "grandes ecoles" are also bonded in return for an
enforceable (i.e., penalties for evaders) commitment to a specified period of government service.
In addition to these recruitment mechanisms, governments use other instruments to
attract  people  with  scarce  skills.  Market  supplements or  recruitment  bonuses  are  used  for
250n  average only 1 in 19 examinees  pass the level I exam (for the higher civil  service), I in 9 the level 11  exam, and I in 7.5 the Level
II!  exam. Each year about 1300  applicants pass the Level I exam,  but only about 700 (54%) are appointed by the Ministries. The number
of applicants taking the entrance exams is reported to have fallen in recent years due to the gnrwth of the Japanese economy and
competition with the private sector, as well as eroding prestige of the public service.
2&1The  predominance of Tokyo University  graduates becomes even more pronounced at the highest levels of government.  Ctitics
maintain that the "clique' of high-ranking  civil servants with Tokyo University  degrees hae  used their influence to block promotions of
graduates from other schools. A few  ministries have recently  moved  to promote some graduates from other universities  to top management
positions, but it is too early to tell whether this represents a major policy shift.  In addition, new recruits increasingly  come from more
diversified  backgrounds  with derees,  for eample, in engineering  and public  administration.  See, Paul S. Kim,  Japan's Civil  S.Vvice  System:
Its Structure, Persnonel and Politics Westport: Greenwood Press, 1988.23
specializations  in short supply. In Japan, bonuses are now offered to recruits in remote geographical
areas as well as for  hard-to-recruit  professions.  In  addition, more  flexible working and  leave
conditions are offered to scientific personnel on entry.
In contrast to the mandarin systems,  some countries favor an alternative, more open
model of civil service  recruitment. They emphasize  flexible,  decentralized, sometimes market-oriented
practices. The U.S. system stands in stark relief from elite models, for example, permitting horizontal
entry without age restrictions and  allowing considerable inter-class mobility, though inter-agency
mobility is rare.'  The U.S. also has moved toward more flexible hiring practices, replacing its
centralized, competitive entrance examination for entry level staff with profession-specific  exams  and
in some cases non-competitive  procedures affording  individual  managers considerably  more discretion
in hiring.3
Decentralized,  flexible  recruitment  is  gaining  ground  in  the  agency  reform
administrations as well.  Although the U.K  retains its highly centralized recruitment system for the
higher civil service, inducting elite-trained generalists into its fast-stream Administrative Trainee
Program, some flexibilities  are being introduced on a limited basis at lower levels,  thus giving  greater
discretion to Department and Agency heads. 2'  Many departments have begun recruiting directly
from the market, using pay flexibilities  within central guidelines.'
"The  non-hierarchical  qualities of the U.S. system  contriouted, along with steady erosion of real pay  since the 1960s,  to a civil  service
leadership vacuum, motivating  the creation of the Senior Executive  Service  program, discussed later in this paper.
38More  flexible  hiring practices were introduced in the U.S. through the Civil  Service Reform Act of 1978  which  aimed to balance the
need for greater managerial  flexibility  in personnel  decisions with protection of the merit principle. Some observers  worry, however,  that
by decentralizing many aspects of personnel management, CSRA may have encouraged more frequent use of the buddy system and
nepotism in recruitment. This potential for abuse is exacerbated by the suspension of the Professional  and Administrative  Career Exam
(PACE) program and the widespread  use of "Schedule  B"  recruitment procedures  which  allow  managers  to dispense  with competitive  exams
when hiring college  graduates or through "name requests"  which allow  managem  to place a known candidate's  name on a vacancy  short-list,
if he meets minimal qualification requirements.  When surveved,  managers preferred Schedule B arrangements. as it gave them more
control from central intervention in hiring. But results of a Merit System Protection Board survey  in 1989  revealed that 1/3  of rank-in-file
federal employees  reported that they had been denied a job because someone else had benefitted from personal connections. See Carolyn
Ban and Harry C. Redd, "he  State of the Merit System:  Perceptions  of Abuse in the Federal Civil  Service", Review of Public Personnel
Administration.  1991.
2 'Recruitment for high-level  positions and the higher civil service's fast stream - the Administrative  Trainee Programme  (ATP) --
remains under the control of the OMCS and its CSC.  The process for recruiting Administrative  Trainees (ATs) is very selective and
involves  eaaminations-only  10-20%  of the applicants pass this stage--and  interviews  and group work exercises  at an assessment  center. This
recruitment process still seeks out elite-trained generalists. Members of professional  and specialist groups are not admitted to the ATP
fast stream, and as a result, they are largety  prevented from rising to the top civil  service management  positions. ATs are give rotational
assignments  during a two-year  probationary  period. which is followed  bv a 16-week  course at the Civil  Service College. The AT stream
provides the policy core for the UK civil service.  But as Next Steps reforms progress in the UK. this policy core is likely to shrink in
relation to the executing  agency staff.
3In accordance with centrally determined guidelines,  departments are free to recruit through their own personnel units, request the
services  of the cenLral  civil service commission  or use outside contractors. The government is currently creating a Recruitment Agency
out of the CSC which  will market its services  to the departments and agencies. At the top of the agencies. there are as yet no fixed rules
for the recruitment of agencv Chief Executives but generally these positions are open to candidates outside the civil service and are
advertised  nationally. (The fact remains that most of the appointees still come from the career service,  but this reform is stiu quite recent.)
Chief Executives  are selected on the basis of management  experience  and are appointed to fixed terms. In some cases, the government
will pay them salaries above civil service scales to capture highlv  attractive candidates in the market.24
Recruitment reforms in Australia have also sought to decentralize the hiring process
and make selection fairer and more openly competitive. Departments rather than central authorities
now handle recruitment of university graduates for higher level positions.  Some departments, such
as Treasury, run their own internship programs as a recruitment tool.  Although many higher level
staff are selected on a service-wide  basis through the Senior Executive Service, heads of Departments
are  now appointed  on  a  time-limited, contract  basis.  Many  high level  positions are  publicly
advertised,  and  departments  are  legally obliged to  weigh  various  selection  criteria,  including
professional qualifications,  experience, and personal qualities. Panel interviews and reference checks
are used to approximate private sector recruitment procedures.
Devolution of recruitment authority has progressed farthest  in Sweden and New
Zealand.  In  the  former, agencies develop  their  own procedures  in  conformity with  national
guidelines.  Most use  examinations, interviews and  professional job  descriptions.  The  central
government personnel agency runs a head-hunting unit that assists ministries and agencies in the
recruitment of high-level  managers. In addition, market salary supplements are paid to key personnel
in hard-to-recruit professions.
In New Zealand, recruitment has become increasingly decentralized.  Department
cLhief  executives  select and appoint their own staff, subject, once again, to central guidelines. Agency
staff positions are advertised, and market salaries may be offered.  To ensure the political neutrality
of chief executive appointments, the State  Services Commission assembles interview panels with
representatives of the business  sector and other elements of the non-government community  to select
CEs. CE job descriptions are cleared with the individual  Minister and the Cabinet. CE positions are
advertised nationally within and outside of public service, but so far most CEs have come from the
Senior Executive Service, the only remaining  cross-departmental civil service core recruited centrally
rather than by individual departments.
Lessons:
What  are  the  lessons of  advanced country  recruit  ent  experience  for building
professionalized  civil  services  in developing countries? First, developing countries should pay at least
as much attention to recruitment as do advanced administrations. The induction of good staff can
compensate for numerous other system deficiencies; conversely, the absence of qualified cadres is
difficult to  overcome later.  Developing country CSM reforms, including those sponsored by the
Bank, have not adequately addressed the need to improve the quality of recruitment practices (except
with regard to hiring freezes to stem public employment expansion). Concentrated efforts in this area
may yield higher payoffs than some other types of CSM  assistance.
Second, while staffing constraints in developing countries affect  all levels of  the
bureaucracy, many countries correctly perceive the most urgent task to be that of filling higher level
management and policy positions with qualified professionals.  This need justifies adopting at least
some features of the mandarin model, which emphasizes the selection and grooming of elite-trained
cadres for higher positions. The mandarin model is attractive in spite of its disadvantages, including
the approach's perceived violation of egalitarian values; low credibility of elitist credentials (due to
inferior quality training and educational institutions); and the absence of qualified subordinate cadres,
whose support  is important to  successful performance of  the elite  administrative class.  These
obstacles can be formidable, as witnessed by the  numerous unsuccessful efforts  to  replicate the
French ENA  ,perience around the world.25
Still,  certain elements of the elite cadre approach have real advantages for developing
countries with limited human resource endowments, where selective rather  than comprehensive
efforts may be warranted.  Creating a prestigious image for a small, well-chosen mandarin class can
have favorable spillover effects in motivating other parts of the civil service.  Moreover, a flexible,
eclectic strategy, using only the most positive aspects of the mandarin model, and combining them
with other approaches, may avert some of the aforementioned pitfalls.  For example, the exclusive
aspects of the mandarin model can be retained while the exclusionary  ones mitigated by (1) allowing
entry into the elite class or the feeder institutions at multiple points on a career path, (2) by  ensuring
equitable access from all parts of society into the elite cadre, and (3) by strictly enforcing meritocratic
entrance criteria.3  Such policies should be coordinated with establishment planning mechanisms to
avert excessive  entrants into feeder institution. This is necessary  to minimize  pressure for civil  service
employment expansion from swelling  numbers of feeder institution graduates claiming entitlement
to government employment. 32
Other  recruitment mect. nisms  used in advanced systems  could also prove adaptable
to developing country needs.  Bonded scholarships are already in use in some LDCs.  Difficulties
faced by governments in raising civil service remuneration ievels can be offset by such sweeteners
designed to attract high caliber candidates to the public sector.  Such programs could be expanded
and targeted to specific skill gaps, as they are in Singapore. Needless to say, enforcement difficulties
may be greater in developing countries, and conditions of service upon return may largely determine
the success of this type of instrument.
Deficiencies  in  developing  country education  systems can  be  compensated  by
supplementary pre-service education programs, which, as the Asian experience shows,  can be a highly
efficient means  to  target  civil servants with  customized training.  Pre-service internships or
"cadetships"  may serve the same purpose.  The additional "probationary" mechanism used in the
German system may provide an effective way of weeding out  unsuitable employees before they
become legally entrenched.
The mandarin preference for generalist recruits who can be molded to fit precise civil
service needs can also be  complemented in developing countries by adjunct programs to recruit
specialists  with necessary technical skills at various bureaucratic levels. Relaxation and diversification
of remuneration norms on a limited and carefully monitored basis may be necessary and desirable in
LDCs where such technical expertise is in short supply. Some of the more flexible,  market-oriented
approaches emerging from the agency reform countries might be instructive  here.  New Zealand and
the  U.K,  for example, are  emphasizing the  importance of technical and  management skills to
supplement the existing  policy  orientation of civil  servants. These reforms also stress the importance
of going to the market to find such talents and of providing  recruiters with the necessary discretion
to compete in that market with regard to remuneration and benefits. These reforms also underscore
the  need to  determine on  a decentralized basis which skills are necessary and for  how long, a
flexibility  which could be helpful in LDC settings.
31Perhaps  such criteria could be expanded to include practical  experience as well as academic achievement.
32The distonion of the French ENA system in several African  countries legally  entitled university  graduates to civil  service  jobs upon
receiving  their degree, thus creating tremendous pressure to expand government  employment  bevond reasonable fiscal limits.26
Introducing these types of market competition and challenging traditions of lifetime
entitlements may indeed spur civil service performance, but prudent operationalization is required.
Full adherence to decentralized, market recruitment models also poses risks in developing contexts,
especially when the "market" consists mainly of international donors bidding up the price of scarce
professional talent, often  resulting in a  relentless brain drain  from the  public to  the  private -
international sector. The introduction of recruitment flexibilities  in developing contexts also provides
opportunities for favoritism and corruption, which are perhaps less likely  when uniform standards are
enforced.
This highlights issues related to the retention of a government-wide  corps inculcated
with  a  public service ethos,  discussed at  greater  length  shortly.  The  tensions  between  the
development of such a  cadre  and  the  thrust  toward decentralization and  relaxation of central
recruitment norms have still to be resolved in agency reform countries.  The dilemma looms even
larger in LDCs where the supply of professional skills is so limited.'
Finally, the  emphasis on  elite  recruitment  should not  lead  to  neglect of  higher
recruitment standards for middle and lower level civil servants. While recognizing  that improving  r:ie
quality of lower level staff  is in many ways dependent  on  improving the  capacity of the  basic
education system  - usually  a long term proposition, -- tightening  admissions  criteria for all civil  service
entrants is something that can begin to be addressed now.  A fundamental lesson, therefore, to be
drawn from the industrial country cases is the importance of developing rigorous (but appropriately
conditioned by individual country circumstances) standards for entrance examinations to improve
recruit quality. Such testing attains even higher importance where educational credentials are difficult
to rely upon, unfortunately the case in many LDCS2'
Building an Elite from Within: Lessons from the Senior Executive Service Experience
Recruiting new entrants into a prestigious higher civil  service class through elitist, pre-
service feeder  institutions offers  one  strategy  to  meet  the  urgent need  to  build higher  level
management and policy capacity in developing countries.  Some LDCs are investigating another.
building  an elite, professionalized,  service-wide  corps through the creation of Senior Executive  Service
(SES) programs.  The SES experience is important to examine, because some civil service reform
programs have installed such schemes without a full understanding of the intricate problems they
involve. This section looks at the SES experience in several developed countries, and considers the
merits and feasibility  of adapting similar arrangements in developing administrations.
A  number  of  developed  country governments have  taken  steps  to  isolate  the
management of senior personnel, providing more attractive incentives and conditions of service than
33An  extreme example of this pervasive  di'emma is found in Mozambique  where short supply of skilled professionals coincides  with
low government  pay and artificially  high salaries paid by international donor projects. See, Peter Fallon and Luis Pereira da Silva,  'Public
Pay and Employment  Issues in Mozambique,"  World Bank. 1991.
34Attempts  to apply  uniform  standards to civil  servants have been made through some Bank  supported programs,  such as the Economic
Management project in Guinea which introduced competency testing to establish minimal requirements for civil servants.  The
implementation of this program proved difficult as it met with considerable resistance from entrenched employees. This experience
underscores the need to apply rigorous selection criteria at the outset through the recruitment process, rather than relying  solely on
programs to raise standards at mid-career points.27
those available to lower level staff.  Senior Executive Services were designed, for the most part, to
combat a common set of problems plaguing many higher civi; services in recent years. These include:
1) wage erosion in comparison with the private sector and wage compression in relation to lower civil
service echelons; 2) increasing marginalization  of higher civil service cadres from policy and political
decision makers because of perceived lack of the former's perceived lack of responsiveness  to political
agendas; 3) the absence of a public-spirited, interagency, service-wide corps or elite cadre; and 4)
difficulty  in attracting highly  qualified professionals  away  from the private market. Governments have
thus  commonly  sought  to  establish  interdepartmental  executive  corps,  sometimes  through
strengthening or perhaps diversifying  existing elite cadres (as in France) and sometimes by trying to
instill a public service ethos to counterbalance the atomistic tendencies of agency reforms (as in New
Zealand).
Japan and France have made efforts to strengthen the elite corps of their civil  services
by broadening the experience and vision of corps members through increased interdepartmental
mobility.  Both countries have stepped up rotational policies to encourage movement of the top
administrative classes among agencies.  Both have sought to diversify the composition of the elite
(through widening the net of recruitment beyond Tokyo University in Japan and through opening
access to  ENA  beyond a  small select  group  in France).  'n  its  efforts  to  strengthen  its elite
administrative  class, Singapore introduced a superscale pay category above the general salary  schedule
and a separate career scheme for the top grades.
Perhaps the most intensively  studied program is the U.S. Senior Executive Service,
created in 1979 and administered by the Office of Personnel Management. Uniquely, the U.S. SES
includes both career civil servants (90%) and political appointees (10%).  The SES was created to
improve the pay and status of senior officials;  to create a service-wide  senior personnel system with
increased opportunities for mobility,  management training and career development; and to reduce
tensions between political appointees and career officials. Enhanced remuneration packages linked
to performance evaluation criteria were to be traded off against secure civil service status, foregone
upon entering the program. The U.S. concept differs from closed,,elite models in that it is possible
to  rise through  the civil service ranks to  attain SES status  or  to  enter  laterally from outside
government.
These objectives have frequently conflicted, and on most progress has been slow.
Efforts to depoliticize the cadre have been resisted, with the number of posts filled by career SESers
declining in relation to political appointees since inception. A service-wide senior personnel system
with increased mobility  opportunities has not yet taken hold, and the federal bureaucracy remains
segmented into powerful agencies with separate cultures and loyal permanent officials. No formal
mechanism for inter-agency assignments has been established, and management developmen; and
training for senior personnel has occurred only on a limited basis.  Progress on the pay front also
lagged.  Inflation steadily eroded  real pay between 1979 and  1990, but in 1991 legislation raised
average SES salaries by 18 to 25 percent.
Despite these failings,  SES critics have sought to strengthen rather than eliminate the
corps, assailing  the government's lack of sustained commitment as the root of its troubles. The 1989
Volker Commission, charging that  the SES's problems stemmed mainly from underfunding and
politicization rather than a flawed program concept, urged restoration of 1969 pay levels, assignment
of greater responsibility  and the provision of training to career officials,  and reduction in the number
of political appointees,28
Canada has also tried to develop a new interdepartmental, corporate  identity for
senior  managers and  to  increase  their  mobility throughout  government.  To  build this  corps,
government consolidated all senior managers into the six-tier Management Category.  While the
number of staff in this category is controlled by the central personnel authority, departments can
decide whom to promote and recruit into this group.  So far, the inertial power of the  department-
as-fiefdom  system has thwarted mobility,  but recently introduced management training and rotational
assignment mechanisms have raised hopes of achieving program goals.
The desire to  maintain a service-wide elite corps is strong, even in agency reform
countries with an apparent  commitment to decentralized staffing approaches.  In this effort, some
reforming administrations are wrestling with the  inherent  contradictions between  private sector
models and public service values. In the U.K, for example, questions have been raised about the role
of the traditional corps of elite administrators now occupying key positions in gradually shrinking
central departments vis a vis the new executing agency staff.  The latter are hired increasingly  on
fixed-term  contracts (mainly higher level professionals) and, it is intended, more and more at market-
determined salaries.  The central elite corps, on the other hand, has traditionally been revered for
its policy skills; it continues to be dominated by recruits with Oxbridge humanities degrees.  If the
social, administrative, and  functional cleavages between this core and the new staff in executing
agencies is not resolved, policy and implementation could become dichotomized and uncoordinated.
In Sweden, the higher civil service  faces the same tensions. While higher civil servants
continue to be paid in compressed pay scales, senior managers in agencies are converting to fixed
contracts, with individually  determined pay. Thus heads of large agencies are sometimes paid more
than highly ranked civil servants in central core ministries with agency oversight responsibilities.
New Zealand and Australia face similar quandaries.  With the introduction of the
"market economy model of management" in New Zealand, departments are increasingly hiring on
fixed contracts at market competitive salaries.  Conforming to private sector norms, staff loyalties
increasingly  lie with individual  departments rather than the public service as a whole.  In an attempt
to "have it both ways,"  the State Services  Act sought to combat the threat of departmental atomism
and the potential erosion of the public service ethos through the creation of the Senior Executive
Service. A select, cross-department corps appointed by the individual  CEs, but with State Services
Commission  (SSC) approval, SESers are retained on fixed-term contracts with centrally determined
salaries for up to five years. SES members receive common training from the SSC. The result is that
SESers are  sometimes earning less than other  managers in  the departments to  which they are
assigned. The SES concept, in consequence, is viewed with frustration and confusion.
Australia's Senior Executive Service was created in the midst of wide pay and grading
reforms, isolating the top levels of the former higher civil service from lower echelons in order to
decompress salaries  and  restore  purchasing power  to  higher  management  levels through  the
introduction of a separate category of senior specialists.  Salaries for department heads --not SES
members-- are supposedly set according to market criteria (as opposed to rank or grade level) but
cannot exceed ceilings set centrally for the SES.
Although many  of the SES experiences are too recent to evaluate fully,  so far efforts
to  build strong  interdepartmental senior executive corps with appropriate  remuneration and the
capacity for independent responsiveness to high-level policy makers have had only modest results.
Preventing wage compression and erosion in the context of fiscal constraints has proven difficult,  and29
the inherent tensions between market-oriented managerialism  and a public-spirited  service-wide  cadre
have yet to be  resolved in reformist administrations.  Still, in the  main SES experiments have
succeeded minimally  in establishing self-contained corps with superscale pay categories, introducing
separate performance criteria and cross-agency  training programs, and laying  the basis for inter-agency
rotation. Significantly,  governments  with quite distinct approaches to civil  service management appear
to share a commitment to continuing the struggle to develop elite corps.
Lessons:
Should developing countries create senior executive services to build and insulate an
elite, professional cadre?  While it is difficult to recommend the adoption by LDCs of an instrument
which has met with such mixed results in developed contexts, the dramatic dearth of qualified higher
civil servants  in  many developing administrations argues powerfully for  the  adoption  of  some
mechanism to  groom and motivate a strong, cross-service  executive class.  In this case, LDC civil
services might profit more from the mistakes than the successes of advanced countries in designing
their own SES programs.
For example, in order to keep professional standards high and to avoid abuses, SES
programs should not  include political appointees. 35 Conditions of  service may be  either  with
permanent civil service tenure or on a rfxed-term basis. If they are the latter, terms should be long
enough to ensure continuity, and the remunerative and career rewards must justify the extra risk
assumed by SES prospects in giving up civil service security.  If SES members retain civil service
permanency, salaries should be kept high through periodic review, and, if necessary, insulated from
generalized erosion down the civil service ranks, since underfunding has been an Achilles' heel of
SES programs in developed settings.
But SES programs must aspire to grander objectives than maintaining or restoring
higher civil service salary levels or decompressing  wages. Unfortunafely, deteriorated pay conditions
have kept some developing country SES  experiences narrowly focused on compensation issues. Other
attributes of elite cadre development should not be ignored. SES programs should be comprehensive,
offering targeted  training, greater  career  opportunities,  and high prestige, in  addition to  better
remuneration.
In addition, while it has admittedly proved difficult in advanced countries to achieve
interdepartmental mobility  for SES members, such mobility  remains an important goal for LDCs. 'he
objective is to  develop broad  policymaking skills and  to  prevent uneven distribution of scarce
expertise in government, leading typically  to strong professional enclaves in high profile ministries
such as finance and conversely  weak ones in less prestigious sectors such as education.
Finally, developed country experience emphasizes the difficulties in "getting it right"
on the  first (or even the second) try.  SES design is an ongoing process, and it should build in
possibilities for reassessment and reformulation.
35Keeping  the SES pure of political patronage and corruption is a particularlv  vexing problem in Latin America. for example,  where
politicized  rather than professionalized  civil services  are the norm.  Attempts to install a (vcry modified) SES arrangement in Pem with
World Bank financing,  for example. resulted in charges that the superscale salaries amounted to a slush fund for powerfully  connected
individuals.30
C.  MANAGING INCENTIES  TO CIVIL SERVICE PERFORMANCE  -- APPROACHES TO
CLASSIEYING. PAYING AND PROMOTING STAFF
Reward structures are central to  performance motivation for civil servants.  This
section analyzes several advanced country approaches to key aspects of civil  service incentive systems.
It poses the following  questions: What are some successful  and/or innovative  approaches to classifying
and paying civil servants in developed countries?  How should staff performance be assessed and
linked to pay and promotion?  What are the most constructive ways to assess staff performance?
What strategies should developing countries follow in light of advanced country experience?
How to Classify and Pay Civil Servants: Traditional Standards Vs. Flexibility
Developed government systems for classifying  and paying public service employees
range from traditional approaches, which emphasize centrally determined standards with little room
for individual deviation, to  increasingly flexible and  decentralized  approaches.  The  following
discussion  briefly reviews the established conventions, looks at attempts to introduce flexibilities  into
pay and classification systems, and then considers the implications for civil service requirements in
developing countries.
Traditional civil services  have relied mainly  on unified pay scales  with automatic, fixed
step increments based on seniority and determined on a service-wide basis.  Sometimes public pay
scales were  derived from private sector comparator surveys; sometimes they were formed in the
context of collective bargaining with trade unions. The basic elements of this traditional system still
operate for the majority of civil servants in  many advanced countries, including Japan, France, the
Netherlands, Canada, the U.S., Germany, and Korea.
These  systems  classify positions  according  to  differences  in  job  duties  and
responsibilities  and rank these positions into occupational groups.  Each group has a unified salary
schedule determined by the central personnel authoe tv, often on the basis of cost-of-living  analysis.
Recommendations for service-wide  adjustments are usually  made on an annual basis. Each grade has
a flat salary amount and contains a  number of incremental steps.  For each year of service civil
servants receive one step increase.  Emplovees typically have guaranteed job tenure and progress
through increments automatically.  Occasional variations in this system stem from the role of trade
union negotiations in setting wage levels for lower level staff.
These systems pose a number of problems.  They have usually been designed by
technical experts in central personnel departments, not by managers who understand real line job
requirements.  Because traditional classification  systems make it difficult for workers to exceed their
job descriptions and develop new skills, they can discourage creativity and initiative.  And because
pay cannot be raised without promotion to the next grade, a "grade creep'  phenomenon occurs.
Many countries are introducing modifications in traditional classification systems.
Alterations represent attempts to moderate the rigid  standardization of conditions of service to reflect
more accurately actual differentiation among  jobs and employees. This is being done through a variety
of mechanisms.  The  increasingly popular  practice of "broad-banding," for example, encourages
flexibility. Broad-banding means recruits enter  the service in a salary range rather than at a fixed
point, as was traditionally the case.  Moving up the ladder, increments are neither automatic (i.e.
through seniority) nor fixed. Staff can therefore be rewarded more flexibly. In the US an experiment31
with broad-banding is being applied to laboratory scientists through the Navy Demonstration Project,
though efforts to extend the approach to the general civil service have met with some obstacles. As
a rule, broad-banding is accompanied by classification  simplification  and a reduction in the number
of grades and job categories.  In Australia,  where broad-banding is used selectively, the 1987 pay
agreement with government unions replaced over 100 white-collar  office classification  structures with
a single, broad-banded, 8-level system.  This was a significant political accomplishment, as broad-
banding is often opposed by unions fearing the erosion of standardized norms.  In general, broad-
banding is thus more easily implemented at senior levels. 3'
Broad-bands are being used in Australia's new Senior Executive Service and in the
Swedish  higher civil  service. New Zealand's civil service reform program has succeeded in instituting
broad-banding for all civil service employees. 37
Pay and classification systems have been made simpler and more flexible through a
range of other mechanisms  as well. "Multi-skilling",  for example, is being used in Australia to increase
mobility and staff deployment flexibility for lower and middle-level  jobs.  Through departmental
workplace reviews, tasks are redesigned to include a much wider range of skills requirements, and
staff  are  given  a  broader  array of  training  opportunities.  Undertaken  with  extensive union
consultation, multi-skilling is reputed  to have increased job satisfaction and worker productivity
significantly.
State governments in Australia have taken  this flexible pay and work condition
approach further.  In New South Wales, innovations include greater use of permanent, part-time
employment, and longer daily shifts traded off against shorter work weeks and job-sharing. These
steps have in  turn afforded managers more flexibility in paying staff.  New South  Wales is also
offering flexibilities  through "cafeteria-style super-annuation benefits which can be combined with
and substituted for base pay to create individually  customized remuneration schemes up to a pre-set
ceiling.
Supplementing basic salary packages with non-wage allowances represents another
move toward pay flexibility. In Japan, an elaborate set of allowances can comprise as much as 50
percent  of  an  employee's total  compensation package. 3' The  merits of complicated non-wage
allowance  systems in third world countries are often justifiably  assailed  for their lack of transparency.
But in developed administrations,  where public wage and employment policies are generally under
control, allowances can be used as instruments for flexibility;  that is, they can be allocated or raised
in prosperous times and lowered or retracted in lean years.  Salary  policy in Singapore, for example,
intentionally retains such allowances over the basic wage as a built-in adjustment mechanism  which
accommodates budgetary uncertainties.
3 ' Broad-banding  also brings with it, however,  the need to introduce appraisal-feedback  systems in order to evaluate and clasify staff
property.
37Chief  Executives  and Senior Executive  Service  staff pay is set centrally on an individual  contract basis. In place of the 40 to 50 raed
salary scales that existed prior to reforms, there are now only frve salary ranges for lower level  staff and two for professional  and advisory
staff.
35TIese include an an-ay  of supplements  which  mirror those in the Japanese private sector. "dty"  cost-of-living  allowances,  'end-of-yeae
allowances  (the 13th month salary) and "diligence'  allowances32
Accommodating  cost-of-livingdifferences  amonggeographical  regions  through  locality
pay"  is another form of differentiation. Locality  pay is used on a limited  basis in the U.K. (for
selected agencies  and through the  London-weighting  system),  and in Sweden and Japan.  Pay
flexibilities  to attract hard-to-recruit  skills  have also been tried on a limited  basis  in the U.S."
Methods  of pay  determination  also affect  the degree  of flexibility  governments  enjoy
in setting  civil  service  wage  levels. In many  countries  centralized  mechanisms  &et  public  sector pay
according  to the "fair  comparison"  principle;  iLe.,  surveys  of private sector pay inform  service-wide
wage  settlements,  usually  negotiated  with  organized  labor. Lately,  governments  have  been attempting
to build  more maneuvering  room into these pay determination  arrangements. In the Netherlands,
for example,  the Ministry  of Home Affairs  continues  to negotiate  national  pay  settlements  with the
unions,  but pay is no longer tightly  linked  to private  sector wage  movements  through the previous
system  of semi-annual  adjustments.  France  has established  a new  formula  for improvements  in salary
structure  when economic  growth  exceeds  three percent in a given  year.  Similarly,  Singapore  now
administers  a "fled-wage"  system,  adjusting  pay  with the economy's  performance. In good years,  the
government  pays  middle  and end-of-year  bonuses  to all civil  servants. It also pays  one-off incentive
bonuses  when economic  growth  exceeds  threshold  levels.
The locus  of public  pay determination  also has implications  for the correspondence
between civil  servants'  salaries  and local market conditions. Increasingly,  civil  service  pay is set at
more decentralized  levels, resulting  in more heterogeneous pay outcomes.  In some cases, this
decentralization  reflects the increased  autonomy  of agencies  to hire at market rates.  Sweden,  for
instance, has undertaken local market pay experiments  in a few agencies.  In other instances,
decentralization  signifies  the erosion  of labor's  ability  to engage  government  in centralized,  across-the-
board wage  settlements;  thus such settlements  are negotiated at more disaggregated,  decentralized
levels.
While countries such as the  U.K. and Australia are  moving gradually  toward
decentralized  pay  determination,  New  Zealand  has moved  even more  decisively  down  this road. With
the State Services  Commission's  assistance,  lower  level staff salaries  are now negotiated  between
Chief Executives  and relevant  unions at the departmental  level.  Managers'  salaries  are negotiated
individually,  with guidelines  (and,  for SESers,  wage  ceilings)  provided  centrally.  Some  anomalies  have
occurred:  chief  executive  salaries  and fringe  benefits  are on average  higher than those  of ministcrs.
They  do not yet match private  sector comparators,  however.
Lessons:
The  following considerations emerge from this  discussion of  LDC  pay  and
classification  systems.  First, for many developing  countries a powerful  rationale for traditional,
unified,  fixed-increment  classification  and  pay  systems  is that they  appear  to require  less  administrative
intensity  to install and maintain. Administrative  simplicity  is an important,  perhaps  overwhehning
consideration  for developing  country  public  sectors  with  extremely  severe  human  resource  constraints.
Nonetheless,  the reality  in most LDCs  is that unified  classification  and pay  structures  are undermined
39The new 1991 Federal Pay Law  authorizs agencies to set up "triple.R  bonus programs  for the recruitment,  relocation, or retention
of key personnel.  Within  OPM guidelines,  agendces  can establish their own procedures for the ailocation of bonuses which can amount
to as much as 25% of base pay. TripleR recipients must agree  in writing  to stay on the job for at least one year.33
and distorted  by a range of informal circumventions (including allowances, grade creep, double
employment, etc.) reflecting the naturally occurring differentiation in government bureaucracies.
Moreover, innovations such as broad-banding can actually reduce the number of job classifications
and simplify  the grading structure in addition to providing  needed flexibility  in rewarding  difficult-to-
attract professional skills -- a major problem in many developing countries.  Similarly,  multi-skilling
may use scarce skills more efficiently by allowing  broadly trained staff to move easily among a range
of tasks.
In countries with highly mobilized labor movements, the relaxation of standardized
norms and the decentralization of pay determination may meet poliical resistance.  But Australia's
experience suggests that close consultation with relevant trade unions can overcome this difficulty.
The costs of nationally negotiated pay settlements to financially  strapped LDCs make this experience
worth examining  more closely.
As the New Zealand case suggests,  decentralized classification  and pay arrangements
may also offer potential financial efficiencies and promote better line management.  In developing
countries, mechanisms  such as locality pay may facilitate a more efficient distribution of civil service
employees to far-flung  regions which normally have difficulty  attracting personnel. But relaxation of
centralized controls poses h *ightened risks  in developing  countries where the fiscal  balance is delicate,
and political patronage abuses are commonplace.'  Thus, flexibility  and decentralization should be
promoted in direct relation to the strength of personnel institutions at the center,  the degree of
central control over establishment management, and the quality and enforceability of central policy
guidelines.
Finally,  developed country wage policy  models linking  civil service pay and allowances
with shifts in  the macro-economy could be highly instructive to LDC administrations that have
traditionally used  bonuses  and  allowances to  compensate  for  deficiencies in  the  civil service
remuneration package, or as political patronage or social welfare mechanisms. Singapore's strategic
and conservative utilization of these instruments has enabled its government to defuse civil  servants'
salary expectations and has provided the necessary leverage to avert future financial strain.
Assessing  Performance: Links to Pay and Promotion
A topical issue in advanced country CSM reforms is how best to relate rewards to
performance in motivating  civil  servants. This discussion  focuses on the role of performance in paying
and promoting civil servants. To what extent are performance based pay and promotion conducive
to improving  civil service staff productivity? How are advanced countries tackling these questions,
and what approach makes sense for LDCs?
Although most advanced civil services were  theoretically built on a merit system,
remuneration policies traditionally  have operated on the basis of automatic, seniority  related increases
rather  than performance criteria.  Despite increasing emphasis on  performance-related pay and
performance appraisal as an important tool in both public and private human resource management
'The  Bolivian  experience  with  decentralization  of public  sector pay suggests  that systemic  inequities  and fiscal  irresponsibility  can result
when central personnel organs relax control of government  pay determination. In Bolivia,  the chaotic, uncoordinated institutional  set-up
at the national level contributed significantly  to the systemic disorder.  See Barbara Nunberg, 'Bolma: A Review of Public Pay and
Employment Issues",  LAC divisional  working  paper. World Bank. 1990.34
circles, it is noteworthy that  some quite successful administrations do not  stress performance in
determining civil servants' pay.  In Korea, France, and Japan, for the most part, pay is very little
affected by individual  performance.
In Korea, for example, civil service pay is mainly determined by seniority progression.
Although pay does vary among individuals through the  allocation of  allowances, these are  not
awarded on  the  basis of  performance criteria.  Despite formal adherence to  performance pay,
informal social conventions undermine the recognition of individual  as opposed to group excellence.
Thus, an annual merit bonus, theoretically given to the top  15 percent of performers, is in reality
distributed on a annuai rotational basis to each department staff member, regardiess of performance.
Each employee will thus receive a bonus at least ucice over a several year time-frame. 41
Several governments have introduced some performance-based features into basically
traditional pay systems. Singapore's salary scale, for example, consists of two elements: fixed annual
increments based on seniority and minimaLly  satisfactory performance; and "efficiency  bars" officials
must pass by examination to ascend the salary ladder. The Netherlands has also shifted to a modified
fixed-increment  system.  Annual step increments can now be withheld from poor performers and a
modified performance-pay system (introduced in 1989) covers all civil service employees.  One-off
bonuses for special achievements are also awarded.
Such one-off performance bonuses have also been used, to mixed reviews,  for the U.S.
Senior Executive Service. Bonuses may be useful in that they reward specific accomplishments in a
targeted way without permanently increasing the wage bill through pay raises. Critics assert, however,
that  bonuses can ultimately have a deleterious effect on staff morale.  Not getting a bonus, they
argue, has negative effects outweighing the positive effects on those who do receive a bonus.
A few countries have moved to install full performance-pay systems in  their civil
services. This process in most cases is gradual, with coverage extending beyond a small elite core in
only a few instances.  The U.S. Performance Management and Recognition System, introduced in
1984 for middle and higher-level bureaucrats, represents one of the more fully developed systems.
PMRS has suffered from inadequate funding, and studies reveal that although employees perceive
increased links between better  performance and higher pay, no correlation has been established
between PMRS awards and subsequent individual  or agency performance. 42
The U.K  is gradually moving toward a performance-pay system for all civil servants,
although so far only higher civil servants as well as professional, scientific, engineering and other
specialized personnel are eligible. For these officials,  the annual within-grade increments depend on
the ratings they receive in objectives-based performance appraisals.  With diffusion of the agency
model, some Framework Agreements have been designed by departments and agencies to develop
4tThMiS  is possible,  of course,  mainly  because,  with  cmreely  low  employment  mobility,  employees  are confident they will  be in the same
place in twenty  years and that the system  can be trusted to deal with them fairly. Informants  interviewed  for this study claimed that high-
tier performers probably receied such bonuses  only  slightly  more often than their peers, but certainly not commensurately  with  their true
performance. Although  above average staff are identified by their superiors and groomed for choice assignments, this recopition  is not
explicitly  linked to monetary incentives.
42See  James Peny, "Lining Pay to Performance: The Controversy Continues", in Carolyn Ban and Norma Riccucci, eds., Public
Personnel Management: Current Concens -- Future Challenges Longmanw  New York, 1991.35
their own performance-pay arrangements.  Performance-related pay is an integral part of the more
radical agency reform countries. New Zealand, for example,  uses it for all staff levels. Performance
ratings and position in the salary range determine performance pay increases.'
A few examples of attempts to modify  performance-pay  schemes to reward group rather
than individual performance are worth  noting. The Agricultural Research  Department  in New
Zealand allocates annual pay bonuses to divisions for distribution among competing work teams.
Group awards are being used in limited parts of the French and Swedish administrations,  and in the
U.K. some  Framework Agreements permit  Next  Step  agencies to  introduce  alternative group
performanwe-pay  systems. The Vehicle Inspectorate Agency,  for example, is currently experimenting
with group bonuses.  In the U.S., the OPM-managed Pacer-Share Demonstration Project is using a
productivity gainsharing system to  distribute  a  portion of  productivity savings to  employees of
McClellan Air Force Base.
The use of non-wage incentives  to motivate civil  servants is also emerging as a variant
on performancc-pay approaches.  Cash awards to employees offering suggestions to improve the
organization or enable savings are one such mechanism.  In the U.K,  for example, departments
provide financial incentives to encourage staff to make helpful suggestions.  When a suggestion is
implemented, staff receive as much as 10% of the savings obtained during the first year.4
These variants aside, the deliberate movement in many developed countries toward
individual  performance-related pay systems  is proceeding despite unresolved  questions about the costs
and benefits of this approach.  Though widely used in the private sector, the concept still represents
a significant  departure  for most civil services. There are numerous claims for performance pay: it
underpins the concept of accountability; it provides alternative mechanisms for staff rewards when
promotion prospects are limited; it affords the public sector flexibility  in competing with private
markets for scarce skills;  it builds civil servants' morale in an age of public sector bashing;  it provides
a rational means for allocating  scarce personnel expenditures;  and it lirovides  a means, short of major
public service pay adjustments, to redress private-public pay differentials and internal government
wage compression.
Critics of performance pay point to a range of flaws. The most serious critiques claim
that performance pay over-emphasizes short-term performance over long-term strategic objectives;
produces more demotivated losers than motivated winners; is plagued by measurement problems,
biasing reward unrealistically  toward quantitative and financial measures; encourages standardized
norms that inadequately capture the differences in civil  service  jobs; and is management-intensive  and
costly.
43Awards  for administrative  and support staff range from 2% to 10% of base salary,  awards for advisory  and professional  staff range
from 2% to 20% of base salarv. There is no increment for poor performems.  The Chief Executive's  performance is reviewed  annually  by
the State Services  Commission  against the terms of agreement that were negotiated during the previous  year with the Minister. Lke other
higher civil servants, CEs are on fixed-term  contracts which may be terminated for unsatisfactory  performance.  In practice, however,
contract termination happens rarely if at all.
44According  to one survey,  in 1981,  these schemes resulted in average  savings  of over L760,000  in large  departments  with approximately
40,000  employees.36
Lessons:
Despite the inconclusive  debate cited above, it is difficult  to reject the notion of
remuneration  structures  that relate rewards  to performance.  But  without  clear  evidence,  governments
may end up basing decisions  to  implement  performance  related pay systems  purely on social
preferences. For the Bank,  the question  still looms  as to whether  this  should  be a major  component
of technical  assistance  in civil  service  management.  The hedged  response  is that it is probably  worth
pursuing  in the medium  or longer  run, but is not likely  to be a top priority  currently. The practical
argument  against  performance  pay stems  from its costliness  and management-intensiveness.
It  could also plausibly  be  argued that  several industrial country civil service
management  systems  perform very weli without performance  pay, and that even its adoption in
reforming  administrations  has been recent  and gradual  in nature, utilized  for only  small  numbers  of
civil  servants. Moreover,  given limited  resources,  attention to performance  pay may  be seen as a
trade-off  against improvements  in other parts of developing  country  CSM systems. For example,
nurturing  a rigorous  recruitment  system  or building  a solid establishment  control  system  may  have
greater medium-term  returns than installing  performance-pay  mechanisms.
Fmally,  socio-cultural  resistance  to individual  rewards  undermines  performance-pay
systems  in several  advanced  countries  and could  well  do the same  in some  developing  contexts. This
is less  an argument  for cultural  relativism  than a suggestion  that recent efforts  to shift rewards  toward
the kinds  of group incentives  described  above  may  offer greater prospects  for success and should  be
considered  as an alternative  instrument.
Performance  and Career Advancement
The  difficulties  in introducing  performance-based  pay,  notwithstanding,  many  advanced
countries  are making  increasingly  frequent use of some  form of performance  appraisal  as a basis  for
career  advancement  and promotion.  This  experience  may  be worth examining  for developing  country
adoption. Most performance  appraisal-based  promotion  mechanisms  are imperfect,  suffering  from
many  of the same measurement  problems  as performance  linked pay mechanisms. But in many
LDCs,  the alternative  bases  for upward  mobility,  i.e., nepotism,  seniority,  and cronyism,  are probably
worse. Some approaches  to performance-based  promotion and some suggestions  for developing
country  applications  follow.
Although  all CSM  systems  examined  here had some formal  performance-promotion
link, the  degree of  consistency  between formal systems and the  informal practices of career
advancement  varied. Tr'.  .ional  CSM  systems  exhibited  a greater gap  between  formal  and informal
practice. Korea,  Japan,  and France  were in this group. In Korea,  a semi-annual  official  performance
review rates employees  on  task performance, abilities,  attitudes and integrity.  The resulting
performance  rating contributes  to but does not fully determine promotion  decisions,  which still
consider  seniority  and training  accomplishments  as advancement  criteria. In Japan, a formal  system37
of confidential performance reviews operates  annually, but  real practice mixes a complex set of
considerations based on seniority, social relationships and merit.'
- 4 ,
By contrast, other developed administrations are emphasizing the centrality of truly
operational  performance appraisal mechanisms to  their  advancement systems.  In  the  U.K., a
relatively participative, objectives-based  system has been in use for a few years. All civil servants are
evaluated  annually in  Job  Appraisal Reviews which become  part  of  an  Annual  Staff  Report.
Supervisors interview employees to discuss progress made against previously agreed  upon work
objectives, and to  define new ones for the coming year.  They also identify training needed  to
improve job  performance.  Career development prospects are also discussed.  An 'open" section
records the comments of both parties.  Staff Reports are definitely used in promotion decisions in
the U.K,  as are interviews with candidates' former superiors.  Although merit has long been the
primary  criterion for civil  service appointments, this had traditionally  been construed as some informal
and subjectively determined combination of personal attributes and the quality of policy advice.
Recent reforms have attempted to systematize  evaluation and consequent promotion,  increasing  the
importance of management skills to the success formula.
Singapore  takes one of the most innovative  approaches to performance evaluation and
promotion.  Promotion is largely merit based, with considerable staff mobility among different
ministries over a career.  The government has moved from a confidential evaluation system to  a
participatory performance appraisal system developed by the Shell Oil Company. The performance
appraisal has two parts.  One reviews and assesses past job  performance; the other  assesses the
management and leadership potential --the so called "helicopter capacity"--  of " - subject in an effort
to identify and subsequently  groom executive talent within the civil  service. While not directly  linked
to specific promotions, the latter assessment predicts an individual's  career trajectory. Though it runs
the risk of  becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, this approach brings a  helpful, forward-looking,
strategic perspective to the career development and succession planning functions.
New Zealand  has  forged the  tightest  links between  performance appraisal and
promotion. Using private sector models,  the government has introduced and applied to all employee
levels a  participative, objectives-based system.  Performance is measured against objectives and
standards agreed upon at the beginning of the review cycle.  Individual objectives flow from the
corporate mission  statement and agency business  plan which form part of the Framework Agreement
between Agency and Minister in New Zealand.  The performance appraisal constitutes the building
block of  performance  agreements  between  departments  and  ministers and  is  credited with
strengthening accountability throughout the system.
4`The intricacies of the Japanese system show how formal performance-based  promotion systems are adapted to or distorted by
dominant systems of social preference, resulting, in this case. in a rather functional  arrangement. Members of a recruit  cohort progress
more or less en masse up through the ranks. Distinctions among them are identified on the basis of informal  evaluations  agreed upon by
various of their superiors, and these become  the basis for decisions about assignments  made at their grade level. This informal  ranidng
does not lead to promotion above the cohort. however,  which would  signal a loss of face all around.  Indeed, as each cohort amves
ensemble  at the highest  civil  service  grade,  one cohort  member  is designated  to the vice-ministerial  level  --the highest  civil  servicc  post.
By  common  consent  and tradition,  the  entire  group  then  resigns  to assume  positions  in local  government,  run for  the Diet.  or move  to pre-
arranged  sinecures  in the private  sector. Although  mandatory  retirement  age is  60,  this  mass  *esignation  takes  place  in the middle-fifties.
This  mechanism  has  two  functions:  it saves  face  bv  avoiding  the embarrassment  of one cohort  member  supervising  another and,  through
a 'dignified'  early  retirement  process.  it provides  mobility  channels  for more  junior  staff,  preserving  a youthful  and vigorous  civil  service
profile.38
A voluminous  literature documents the difficulties  in designing  performance appraisal
systems that accurately and fairly measure individual performance. Thus, questions about the utility
of this instrrent  as the basis for decisions about career advancement abound.  In particular, it is
frequently asserted that performance appraisal cannot serve the dual purpose of staff assessment and
career development, and that it is generally more appropriate to the latter.  Fmally, some critics see
performance appraisal as a return to 'Taylorism",  breaking down human performance into artificially
disaggregated,  but ultimately immeasurable parts. 4'
Lessons:
The above critiques, however, constitute fine-tuning - a luxury not always available
to developing countries.  In LDC administrations  where standards have broken down, performance-
based promotion systems  can minimally  offer countries broad guidelines for rewarding  and promoting
competence.  This is useful even if informal behavior and preference patterns come to distort the
formal system.  As the Japanese case shows, a reasonable compromise between the formal and
informal can yield a system which at least considers performance as one criterion for advancement.
The feasibility of performance-based promotion arrangements may depend on the
conditions  under  which  they  are  installed.  Experience  suggests that  support  from  executive
leadership, employee participation in the design of the system, and  the timeliness of supervisory
feedback to employees are key to the establishment of successful systems.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has reviewed established practice and emerging innovations in civil service
management in developed countries in order to glean lessons  for developing ones. In some instances,
discussion about altemative approaches revealed ongoing debates, leaving uncertain the optimal
reform strategy.  The  position assumed here,  though,  is that  even with imperfect information
developing countries  must choose  some reform path to  improve the management of  their civil
services. Rather than definitive conclusions,  the guidance offered here constitutes at most hypotheses
and at least "hunches" about what is likely to work under  LDC conditions.  Focusing on  three
principal areas of CSM, -- system organization and management, quality of human inputs, and staff
incentives and performance -- the paper's main findings are summarized below:
--  As  a  general  reform  principle,  traditional,  mainly centralized  civil  service
management  models provide the  best  starting  point  for  many of  the  least developed  country
adminiEtrations. Agency approaches, requiring technological and human resource skills beyond the
present capacity of many LDCs, may, however, provide models toward which some countries --
especially the better endowed -- can strive. Certain selected elements of agency reform might even
now be successfully  emulated by some developing administrations. But any countries contemplating
comprehensive agency type reforms need to assess seriously  the degree to which the requisite human
46For views on this issue, see,  Robert  Glen, "Performance Appraisal: An  Unneiving Yet Useful Process,"  Public Peonnel
Management.  Vol. 19, No. 1. Spring, 1990,  and. Charles Fox, "Employee  Performance Appraisal: The  Keystone  Made of Clay,"  in Carolyn
Ban and Norma Ricucci,  eds., Public Personnel Manatement: Current Concerns - Future ChallengesA.  Longman:  New York. 1991.39
and technical requirements can be met and to think strategically about the necessary  steps to acquire
them.
-- Strong centralized institutions are usually  necessary  to support fledgling  cil  service
management functions in developing countries. Shared power and good coordination among a limited
number of organs at the cenier ensures necessary  checks and balances. To the degree that capacity
can be developed in line entities, some deconcentration is desirable however, for responsive, flexible
personnel management.
-- Certain CSM functions should be given higher priority than others.  This wisdom
is even more powerful in developing countries, where resources are scarce and starker choices about
allocation need to be  made.  Two functions emerged as central:  recruitment and establishment
control.
-- Establishment control provides the foundation for all other CSM functions.  In
those developing countries where this function has historically been poorly managed, centralized
models are advisable.  Developed country experience with strategic, forward manpower planning
could be enormously instructive to many LDCs.
-- Programs to improve the rigor of recruitment standards should receive high priority
in developing countries.  Despite serious pitfalls, some aspects of "mandarin" systems offer many
advantages to  LDCs building a professionalized civil service.  They compensate for other system
failings. Governments should take measures to moderate the elitist characteristics  of the mandarin
approach and, as appropriate, judiciously introduce market flexibilities  to recruit scarce skills.
-- Senior Executive Services,  or similar programs to develop professional elite cadres,
have proved difficult to  design and  implement in developed  countries, but  many flaws can be
corrected in adapting them to LDC contexts where there is often an urgent need to groom higher
level civil servants.  Such services may complement recruitment  rigor.  These programs must be
carefully designed to  include career  mobility and  training as well as remuneration  features, and
exclusion of political appointments is essential to their credibility.
-- Assuming  necessary  minimal, levels of establishment and budgetary control, unified
pay and  classification in  developing countries could arguably be  relaxed, following the  lead of
increasing numbers of advanced countries. The common tendency toward circumvention of existing
unified norms in many developing civil services, along with the need to target scarce skills more
directly with appropriate remuneration packages, reinforces this view.
-- The benefits of performance pay remain to be demonstrated in developed country
public sectors,  and  the  management  requirements and  costs of  installing such systems can be
considerable. Resistance may subvert efforts to effect performance pay arrangements. Given these
difficulties and the urgency of other CSM tasks for LDC administrations, lower priority should be
given to this reform at present.  Performance-related promotion systems,  on the other hand, even if
imperfectly implemented, can help move civil service values toward standards of competence and
merit.40
Suggestions  for Further Work
These  conclusions  represent  best guesses  for LDC  policy  directions  based  on an initial,
broad review  of administrative  experience  in some  advanced  industrial  countries. The intention  was
not to carry  out rigorous  research but to begin  to elevate  the quality  of Bank operational  advice  on
civil  service  management  by flagging  topical  issues  in  worldwide  administrative  reform. Naturally,  this
work  has raised a series  of questions  that require  systematic  investigation  in order to move  beyond
the realm  of speculation. The following  are a few  suggestions  for further inquiry:
0  Rigorous  comparisons  of civil  service  performance  across  countries  do not exist  due
to the absence  of suitable  methods  for measuring  civil  service  performance,  the lack
of comparable  cross-national  data on most questions,  and the inherent  difficulties  in
controlling  for a range  of intervening  variables  such as politics  and culture. Research
to develop  a methodology  for measuring  civil  service  performance  would  be a valuable
contribution  in trying  to determine  which  systems  and approaches  work best under
which  conditions. Initial comparative  work might  begin by developing  performance
measures for  a  single, relatively simple function carried out  by  most central
govermments.
*  Research  on the relationship  between  pay  and performance  in the public  sector  is not
well  advanced,  and  often policies  are adopted  on shaky  empirical  bases. Further work
on this issue,  particularly  in developing  country  contexts,  would  be useful.
*  The effect of private-public  pay differentials  on civil  service  management  functions
could  not be determined  in this project  and would  require  significant  data generation
and collection. Comparative  research might  be worthwhile  in this area.
*  The relative  effectiveness  and efficiency  of agency  reform  systems  versus  traditional
civil  services  need to be studied  rigorously  before credible  policy  prescriptions  can be
extracted  for developing  countries. Given  the recent origin  of many  of the reforms,
such research might be appropriately  undertaken after a suitable  period elapses.
0  Given  the urgent need in many  developing  countries  to build  governmental  capacity,
a more active  form of applied  research  on civil  service  management  topics  might  be
an appropriate  parallel  approach  to those suggested  above. Pilot  experiments  could
be carried  out in LDC administrative  "laboratories"  to examine  the relative  merits  of
say,  different  recruitment,  pay  and classification,  or performance  appraisal  systems  on
a comparative  basis. While  the actual 'experiments' in one or another civil  service
management  improvement  in a particular  country could be financed  as a lending
operation,  the exercise  could  simultaneously  be set up as comparative,  cross-national
research  by undertaking  baseline  studies  and establishing  performance  criteria  for ex-
post evaluation.41
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